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IoT wearables and mobile devices have the potential to dramatically lower health-
care costs through remote health monitoring but come with risks of fraud due to
the lack of physical presence at the time of collection. Many of the problems are
related to access control and can be at least partially alleviated by incorporating
biometric authentication.
Biometrics have several benefits. First, they are more convenient than passwords,
thereby preserving the spirit of IoT. Second, if appropriately selected, they could
have low probability of circumvention. Third, the incorporation of biometrics into
IoT brings concerns of cost and implementing a “user-friendly” design.
While biometrics have their advantages, biometric key generation may suffer from
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environmental noise, intra-user variability. Furthermore, keys generated from bio-
metrics should be uniformly random in order to remain resistant to attack.
1. In order to overcome these detriments, we have developed a statistical ap-
proach called interval optimized mapping bit allocation (IOMBA) to miti-
gate the intra-subject variance while preserving privacy and generating long-
keys. IOMBA tunes the biometric key generation process to each user rather
than relying on a generic approach for all users.
2. We build upon our approach called NA-IOMBA to select and quantize bio-
metric features only for the most robust features that are selected for each
user, thus avoiding unnecessary post-processing costs. Noise models are used
to predict the impact of noise and further reduce error correction costs and
enrollment time.
3. We propose a new paradigm called “Biometric Locking by Obfuscation,
Physically Unclonable Keys, and Reconfigurability” (BLOcKeR) which aims
to provide low-cost template protection and attack resistance in match-on-
card/device applications. We introduce the first ever biometric system im-
plementation that utilizes hardware reconfigurability, bitstream obfuscation,
and strong PUFs.
4. We develop a first ever novel presentation attack where a short template of
Nima Karimian - University of Connecticut - 2018
a victim’s ECG is captured by an attacker and used to map an attacker’s
ECG into a victim’s, which can then be provided to a sensor.
5. We are the first group working on PPG-based human authentication and
recognition using non-fiducial features. Our simulations have shown signifi-
cant improvements for both supervised and unsupervised machine learning
classification.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) is an emerging system paradigm design implementa-
tion of embedded system that connects a variety of devices, sensors, and physical
objects to a larger connected network (e.g. the Internet) that involves substantial
human-to-human and human-to-computer interaction. Hence the need for safe
and secure communication has developed at an equal rate.
There are potential risks that these diverse devices could be intentionally
programmed to act maliciously. While the IoT is expected to expand the user’s
connectivity and everyday convenience, security of IoT devices has gained signifi-
cant attention. One way to combat these security concerns is through secure and
reliable authentication. With the billions of IoT endpoints projected to exist in
the near future, traditional forms of access control like passwords are outmoded.
Most passwords are so simple that they can be easily guessed (especially based
on social engineering methods) or broken by simple dictionary attacks. Simple
passwords are easy to crack and, thus, compromise security; complex passwords
1
2are difficult to remember and, thus, are expensive to maintain. Users also have
the tendency to write down complex passwords in easily accessible locations. Fur-
ther, most people use the same password across different applications, therefore,
if a single password is compromised, it may open many doors. Finally, passwords
are unable to provide non-repudiation; that is, when a password is shared with a
friend, there is no way to know who the actual user is.
In fact, the conventional approaches (e.g. digital signatures, encryption)
suffer from various shortcomings; they are very slow, expensive, and increasingly
vulnerable to physical and side channel attacks. Many of the limitations of the
traditional passwords can be ameliorated by incorporation of better methods of
user authentication.
Biometrics offers certain advantages such as negative recognition and non-
repudiation that cannot be provided by tokens and passwords. Negative recog-
nition is the process by which a system determines that a certain individual is
indeed enrolled in the system although the individual might deny it [42]. This is
critical in application such as welfare disbursement where an impostor may at-
tempt to claim multiple benefits under different names. Non-repudiation is a way
guarantee that an individual who accesses a certain facility can not deny using
it (e.g., a person accesses a certain computer resource and later claims that an
impostor must have used it under falsified credentials).
3Biometrics are a more appropriate option and have several major benefits.
First, they are more convenient than passwords, thereby preserving the spirit of
IoT. Second, if appropriately selected, they could have low probability of circum-
vention. Third, besides access control, they could be used to enhance many IoT
systems. Furthermore, the recent advancements in low cost sensor technologies
makes the use of biometrics more feasible than ever. However, many of the most
popular biometric modalities (e.g. iris, fingerprint, face, voice) are vulnerable to
presentation attacks. A presentation attack (also called a spoofing attack) allows
an attacker to masquerade as an authentic user to get illegitimate access.
One of the new emerging techniques for human identification consists of the
use of cardiovascular signals as biometrics since they are less prone to fraud. They
are already widely used in the field of health monitoring and can be re-purposed
for biometric identification and access control purposes. Biometric cryptography
must be capable of overcome tiny changes present between biometrics acquired at
different times and under different conditions with the purpose of generating reli-
able keys. The current authentication mechanisms are vulnerable to attacks and
have several drawbacks in terms of implementing in IoT centric environments.
Providing security relies on well-established primitives for key generation, data
confidentiality and integrity, authentication, identification bit commitment, etc.
This thesis investigates and digests new authentication paradigm (cardiovascular-
4based biometric) in order to establish secure and safe authentication in IoT de-
vices. In this thesis, we focus on the use of Electrocardiogram (ECG) and Photo-
plethysmogram (PPG) to implement distributed biometric authentication within
an IoT system model.
1.1 Internet of Things
Internet of things (IoT) will bring remarkable advance to our lives through smart
grid, supply chain, remote healthcare, autonomous vehicles, smart homes, etc.
The recent advancements in low cost sensor in wearable technologies, including
devices such as Fitbit, Apple Watch, and Microsoft Band, we now have access
to a multitude of devices with advanced capabilities that allow us to remotely
collect and monitor an individual’s health information or control physical objects.
Smart home is another example where devices are connected to the Internet and
can make decisions autonomously based on information originating from sensors,
thereby contributing and improving on the personal lifestyle of end-users which
makes it easier to monitor and control home appliances and systems. Intelligent
transportation systems is another one that are used to ensure the transportation
network is efficiently monitored and controlled.
Providing security to IoT devices is a major challenge as small devices tend
to be resource constrained in terms of power and area. In addition, managing
5so many devices with passwords alone is ripe with challenges. Furthermore, the
sensitive data gathered and stored by IoT could pose significant privacy concerns.
For instance, unauthorized access of a wearable device can enable access to other
sensitive IoT objects and may create significant damage. Since the user data is
stored on the IoT devices it could also introduce a severe privacy risk. Another
challenge is the reliability (i.e., trustworthiness) of the physiological and activity
data collected by IoT wearable device. Often healthcare providers and researchers
rely on wearable IoT device to monitor their patients and study subjects remotely,
where users may be tempted to give their own devices to others, e.g., to reach
a prescribed amount of activity, or to contribute the required amount of data to
maintain compliance and receive financial incentives. Therefore, new methods of
authentication need to be developed in order to establish safe and secure commu-
nication or exchange of sensitive data over IoT. Because of the uniqueness of one’s
biometric traits (e.g., face, fingerprint, iris, voice, heartbeat), a biometric-based
security solution is less vulnerable to security breaches for IoT systems or infras-
tructure. However, incorporation of biometrics in IoT application is challenging.
1.2 Biometric
In general, a human property-based authentication (biometrics) refers to the auto-
mated recognition of individuals based on their biological and behavioral charac-
6teristics (e.g. fingerprint, iris, electrocardiogram, face, etc.) that can be presented
to an electronic system as a means of confirming a user’s identity. Compared to
other authentication approaches, human properties are more conclusive and can-
not be guessed or stolen as easily because the biometric is establishing the identity
of an individual based on physical, chemical or behavioral attributes of a person.
The relevance of biometric in modern society has been reinforced by the need for
large-scale identity management system whose functionality relies on the accurate
determination of an individual’s identity in the context of several different appli-
cation. By using biometric, it is possible to establish an identity based on who
you are, rather than what you possess such as an ID card, or what you remember,
such as a password.
Biometric authentication systems generally consist of five major compo-
nents: sensor, feature extraction, template storage/database, matcher, and deci-
sion module (see figure 1.1). The sensor represents the interface between the user
and the authentication system, and its function is to scan the biometric trait of
the user. Feature extraction processes the scanned biometric data to extract the
information that is useful in distinguishing between different users. The feature
set extracted during an enrollment phase is either stored in a remote database
as a template indexed by the user’s identity information (i.e., match-on server)
or stored on a smart card (i.e., match on card/device systems). The matcher
7may be hardware or software which compares the template with an input query.
Finally, the decision module provides a response to the query, i.e., whether the
users biometric matches the template or not.
Fig. 1.1: A generic biometric system.
Bometrics methods are based on physiological traits of humans, which can
be categorized into exterior and interior (see Figure 1.2). The exterior group
includes face, fingerprint, palmprint, iris, palm/finger vein, and voice. While the
exterior biometrics have been researched heavily over the last few decades, they
have significant disadvantages. Most notably, they are easy for attackers to access,
are not robust against cloning, and are vulnerable to presentation attacks. For
instance, our fingers are involved in a lot of daily tasks such as touching keyboards,
glasses, doorknobs, and so forth. Iris systems are susceptible to spoofing by printed
photos. Audio recorders can be used for voice playback to circumvent speech
recognition systems.
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Fig. 1.2: Detailed biometric-based key generation taxonomy.
Bioelectrical signals, such as electrocardiogram (ECG) and photoplethys-
mograph (PPG), have shown promise as biometrics, and their continuous nature
and drastic acquisition variations make it difficult to deploy them for biometric-
based key generation and offer several advantages: (I) ECG is considered to be
unique to each person. An ECG is constructed by the delay between each part of
the heart, such as Sinoatrial (SA), Atrioventricular (AV), etc. nodes. (II) Since
ECG represents electrical activity of heart and a necessary sign of life, it possesses
the quality of universality, a trait that many other biometrics lack. For example,
amputees would not be able to use fingerprint or hand geometry systems; (III)
9ECG is a continuous physiological signal, thus having inherent real-time signs of
liveliness, making it extremely difficult to steal and emulate. It also avoid the need
for additional liveliness detection at the sensor; (IV) ECG is difficult to capture
without cooperation from the person; and (V) Finally ECG is more difficult to
replicate thereby making it resistant to presentation attacks.
1.2.1 Biometric Challenges
A critical issue in biometric system design is the choice of biometric trait. In
theory, any anatomical, behavioral, or physiological characteristic of an individ-
ual can be used as a biometric trait. However, the choice of a biometric trait
for a particular application usually depends on the degree to which the follow-
ing properties are satisfied: (i) uniqueness or distinctiveness, (ii) permanence,
(iii) universality, (iv) collectability, (v) performance, (vi) user acceptance, (vii)
invulnerability, and (viii) integration.
Unfortunately, the biometric signal suffers from noise, which may result in
key generation errors. In general, the performance in biometric authentication is
determined by two kinds of variability among the acquired biometric templates.
The first one is variations of the same biometric trait from the same user is called
intra-class variation which determines minimum false reject rate (FRR) and as
opposed to inter-class variation which relates to different users, whose lower limit
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Fig. 1.3: Biometric system and nine different points of attack.
sets a minimum false accept rate (FAR). Clearly, it is desirable for a biometric key
generation system to have maximal variability between subjects but minimal vari-
ability within subjects. In addition, traditional biometric systems are vulnerable
to various physical attacks which are discussed below.
Biometric Attack Model
Biometric system failures can be categorized into two classes [41]: (1) intrinsic fail-
ures that occur due to intra-user variation and/or lack of distinctiveness for a bio-
metric modality; and (2) failures from attackers who circumvent a system. In the
case of the former, processing and matching capabilities of resource-constrained
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devices may limit decision accuracy of the biometric authentication system. Since
IoT systems are supposed to be convenient, users will likely not tolerate high false
accept rates which prevent them from accessing their devices and data.
As discussed earlier, current biometric technologies can be classified into
match-on card/device and match-on server (see figure 1.4). Considering the cost
and accessibility of the device under attack, attacks can be labeled as follows. Non-
invasive attacks [105], [106] require the lowest cost and no physical tampering.
Semi-invasive attacks [91], [90] require intermediate cost and minimal physical
tampering (e.g., backside thinning). Invasive attacks [64] require the highest cost
and full physical tampering.
Fig. 1.4: Current Matching Frameworks on Biometric System.
In our biometric attack model, an adversary has following goals: template
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theft/recovery, denial of service, and unauthorized card/device access. Many IoT
devices may exist in unprotected or hostile environments which leaves the afore-
mentioned components exposed to non-invasive, semi-invasive, and invasive phys-
ical attacks. Non-invasive attacks [106], such as side-channel attacks, require the
lowest cost and no physical tampering. However, in some cases, physical access
to the device might be needed. Semi-invasive attacks [90] require intermediate
cost and some physical tampering. Invasive attacks require the highest cost and
invasive physical tampering. Examples include circuit edit and micro-probing.
Adversary model attacks generally exploit the system vulnerabilities at one
or more modules or interfaces. A general biometric system and the points of po-
tential attacks are shown in Figure 1.3. In Figure 1.3, the attacks are categorized
by where they take place: user interface, interface between modules, and tem-
plate storage. We assume all the modules and the interfaces among them may be
accessed by the attacker. Adversary attack can be caused by non-secure infras-
tructure. The infrastructure of a biometric system consists of hardware, software
and the communication channels between the various modules. There are a num-
ber of ways in which an adversary can manipulate the biometric infrastructure
that can lead to security breaches.
In Table 1.1, the attacks are organized by their cost and applicability. The
invasive attacks such as microprobing [64] can be utilized to compromise the non-
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volatile memory, such as Flash or Anti-fuse, on the card/device. Semi-invasive
attacks, such as the fault injection and memory bumping attack [91], can be ap-
plied to create false accepts by the matcher and decision module or to determine
the template respectively. Other semi-invasive attacks, such as modifying tem-
plates, may cause the denial of service or unauthorized access. Since both invasive
and semi-invasive attacks require at least minimal physical access, these attacks
can be only applied on the match-on card/device frameworks. In contrast, non-
invasive attacks apply to both types of frameworks. Software-level attacks [105],
such as software Trojan, can be utilized to leak biometric templates. The hill-
climbing attack is performed by iteratively submitting synthetic representations
of the user’s biometric until a successful recognition is achieved [61]. At each
step, the employed data are modified according to the matching score of previous
attempts.
As shown in Figure 1.3, type one attack involves presenting a fake biometric
(e.g., synthetic fingerprint, voice, iris) to the sensor. If the sensor is unable to
distinguish between fake and genuine biometric traits, the adversary easily in-
trudes the system under a false identity. The difficulty of applying this attack
highly depends on the feasibility of creating a fake biometric. This attack can be
classified as a non-invasive attack since it does not require any physical changes
to the system.
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Table 1.1: Possible attacks and vulnerabilities of currently employed biometric
authentication strategies.
Match-on server Match-on card
Invasive attacks
Micro-probing,
Template privacy
Semi-invasive
attacks
Fault injection;
Memory bumping
Unauthorized access
Modify template/parameter
Denial of Service
Unauthorized access
Non-invasive
attacks
Butter overflow;
Software Trojan;
Malware;
Hill climbing;
Comm. protocol
Template privacy
Butter overflow;
Software Trojan;
Malware;
Hill climbing;
Side-channel attack
Template privacy
Second type of attack occurs when a previously intercepted biometric data
is stolen by a hacker as it is transmitted over a network. A replay attack intercepts
the sensor transmission and replays the signal. A common way to secure a channel
is by cryptographically encoding all the data sent through an interface, using
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public key infrastructure. But even then an adversary can stage a replay attack by
first intercepting the encrypted data passing through the interface when a genuine
user is interacting with the system and then sending this captured data to the
desired module whenever he wants to break into the system [41]. To address this
issue, a time-stamp can be associated with each transmission. A major concern
of these solutions is the implementation overhead, which can be impractical for
resource-constrained applications such as low-cost IoT sensors.
In the third type of attack, the feature extractor module is compromised to
produce feature values selected by the attacker. The attacker can force the feature
extractor module to produce the feature values chosen by an attacker instead of
providing the feature values generated from the original data obtained from the
sensor [99].
Because the system stores biometric template locally, the design raises con-
cerns about the biometric template theft in the fourth type of attack. That is, a
stolen smart card gives access to the biometric template. This attack can be clas-
sified a invasive attacks such as microprobing aim to compromise the non-volatile
memory or data buses on the card in order to steal the biometric template.
In addition, the attack on the template database (e.g., adding a new tem-
plate, modifying an existing template, removing templates, etc.) constitutes the
fifth type of attack. Memory bumping is a semi-invasive attack that can also be
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utilized to extract or modify the template stored on a card. The “bumping” is
aimed to bring the blocks of data down to bus width. This attack is a subclass
of the fault injection attacks aimed at internal integrity check procedure in the
chip. An attacker can also intercept the channel to steal, replace or alter bio-
metric template. This attack may induce both the template theft/privacy and
denial of server issues. Against this attack, the communication channel should be
encrypted. However, this will incur additional design overhead.
Genuine feature values are replaced with the ones selected by the attacker
in the sixth type of attack. This type of attack is known as hill-climbing. The hill-
climbing attack is performed by iteratively submitting synthetic representations
of the user’s biometric until a successful recognition is achieved. If the channel
is not secured physically or cryptographically, an adversary may also intercept
and/or modify the data being transferred.
In fact, the transmission medium between the template database and matcher
is attacked in the seventh type of attack, resulting in the alteration of the trans-
mitted templates. Insecure communication channels also allow an adversary to
launch replay [96] or hill-climbing attack [1].
Matcher can be modified to output an artificially high matching score in
the eighth type of attack. Finally, the matcher result (accept or reject) can be
overridden by the attacker. This attack can generate the high matching score to
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bypass the biometric authentication system regardless of the values obtained from
the input feature set.
Various template protection schemes have been proposed such as salting and
non-invertible transform. Salting is a template protection approach in which the
biometric features are transformed using a function defined by a user-specific key.
However, if this the user-specific key is compromised, the template is no longer
secure, because the transformation is usually invertible. The non-invertible trans-
form refers to a one-way function, which is easy to compute but hard to invert.
The main drawback of this approach is the trade-off between discriminability and
non-invertibility of the transformation function. In chapter 5, BLOcKer is ana-
lyzed against the vulnerabilities and attacks on the traditional biometric system.
We also explicitly describe what can be addressed by BLOcKeR.
1.2.2 Biometric Key Generation
Direct cryptographic key generation from biometrics is an attractive proposition
but it is a difficult problem because of the intra-user variability. To overcome
some of the limitations of traditional passwords and smart cards, researchers have
attempted to use biometrics for authentication and/or key generation.
Key generating biometric usually suffer from low discriminability which can
be assessed in terms of key stability and key entropy. Key stability refers to
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the extent to which the key generated from the biometric data is repeatable.
Key entropy relates to the number of possible keys that can be generated. Note
that if a scheme generates the same key irrespective of the input template, it
has high key stability but zero entropy leading to high false accept rate. On
the other hand, if the scheme generates different keys for different templates of
the same user, the scheme has high entropy but no stability and this leads to
high false reject rate. While it is possible to derive a key directly from biometric
features, it is difficult to simultaneously achieve high key entropy and high key
stability. The idea of directly generating cryptographic key from biometrics seems
a very appealing template protection technique and can also be very useful in
cryptographic applications. On the other hand, it is difficult to generate key with
high stability and entropy.
Biometric key generation can be divided into two classes: behavioral and
physiological. In 2002, Monrose et al. proposed the first practical biometric key
generation that exploits behavioral biometrics [66]. They used pattern duration
of keystrokes and latency between keystrokes and combination of password to
increase the entropy of standard passwords. Handwritten signature [28], [103],
[30] is another behavioral technique that uses dynamic and local features of a
signature to generate a key. The keys generated by behavioral biometrics have
been very short (e.g., about 40 in [28]) making them less secure.
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1.2.3 Biometric Hardware/Software Overhead
The traditional methods for biometric authentication aim to find a universal pro-
cess for all users in a population, but this is ineffective and inefficient. In resource-
constrained scenarios, it would be better to eliminate pre-processing steps which
are costly and energy consuming to perform and existing security solutions are
not suitable for low-overhead IoT devices.
In our research, we have focused on a concrete field of security: hard-
ware/software co-design. This technique is widely used for developing specific
and high computational cost devices. Its basis relies on using both hardware and
software solutions in an effective way, thus, obtaining a low-overhead IoT devices
that use dedicated hardware developed. The questions on how we can obtain an
effective solution for biometrics to solve considering all the different aspects of
these systems. Unfortunately, the biometrics suffer from noise, which may re-
sult in key generation errors. Potential errors are corrected with the helper data
(i.e., error correction code or ECC) during later authentication steps which causes
more power in IoT devices. Our proposed solution divides the biometric process
into hardware and software in order to achieve better performance, more than
the existing biometric authentication/key generation to achieve improved trade-
offs between pre-processing and post-processing hardware on a user-to-user basis
through reconfigurable hardware. This partition considers not only the decrease
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of computational time that a hardware can provide, but also reduction of area and
power consumption, increase in security levels, and the effects on performance in
the overall design.
1.3 Hardware Security Primitives
From hardware designers standpoint, they want to protect their design intellec-
tual property (IP) from being misused (by user, competition, silicon foundry,
etc). Hardware-based security primitives such as physically unclonable functions
(PUFs) have had to deal with integrated circuit (IC)/intellectual property (IP)
counterfeiting for chip/system/device authentication purposes. PUF, is a “digital
fingerprint” that serves as a unique identity for a semiconductor device such as
a microprocessor. Like a biometric which expresses a human’s identity, a PUF is
an expression of an inherent and unclonable instance-specific feature of a physical
object. However, hardware security primitives address the issues and enhance the
security and trust of ICs, but they don’t solve all issues associated with human-to-
device authentication. Since IoT devices require interaction between devices and
humans, biometrics can provide an interesting opportunity for improving both the
convenience and security in IoT applications.
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1.4 Contributions
In this thesis, we have made the following contributions.
1.4.1 Key Generation from Cardiovascular Sources
Bioelectrical signals, such as ECG and PPG, have shown promise as biometrics,
but their continuous nature and drastic acquisition variations make it difficult
to deploy them for biometric-based key generation. Errors in key generation oc-
cur due to sources of noise and variability in ECG - power line interface, motion
artifact (MA), baseline wander (BW), electromyography (EMG), and heart rate
variability (HRV). Therefore, we developed interval optimized mapping bit allo-
cation (IOMBA), which exploits population and noise statistics from biometric
data in order to optimally quantize each biometric feature into one or more bits.
1.4.2 PPG based Biometric Authentication
We have also investigated PPG-based human authentication and recognition using
non-fiducial features. In contrast to fiducial methods that extract features (i.e.,
landmarks) in the time domain from a signal, non-fiducial approaches take a more
holistic approach where features are extracted statistically based on the overall
signal morphology. Our simulations have shown significant improvements for both
supervised and unsupervised machine learning classification.
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1.4.3 Presentation Attacks Against Electrocardiogram (ECG)
We have developed the first full-fledged ECG presentation attack. The attack only
requires a template of the victim’s ECG signal. A linear transform is computed
‘on-the-fly’ and used to map the attacker’s ECG into one that more closely re-
sembles the victim’s. Finally, the transformed signal is played by the audio player
to the biometric system’s ECG sensor in order to gain unauthorized access to the
system. In over 2,500 simulations, the proposed method succeeded 96.7% and
91.78% of the time, respectively, for fiducial and non-fiducial feature extraction
methods with only one heartbeat of the victim.
1.4.4 Paradigms that Balance Biometric Reliability and Hardware
Costs
Interval optimized mapping bit allocation (IOMBA) was extended to noise aware
IOMBA (NA-IOMBA) by incorporating sensitivity of ECG features to different
noise sources. In fact, only the most robust features are selected for each user,
thus avoiding unnecessary post-processing costs. When available, noise models
are used to predict the impact of noise and further reduce error correction costs
and enrollment time. Our approaches have been demonstrated on ECG, iris, and
face data from publicly available databases and produced strong results. Results
showed an increase in average key length of 20% while improving reliability by
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15% for worst case noise (1dB SNR).
1.4.5 Biometric Locking by Obfuscation, Physically Unclonable
Keys, and Reconfigurability (BLOcKeR)
We introduce a new framework for implementing biometric systems based on
physical unclonable functions (PUFs) and hardware obfuscation that, unlike tra-
ditional software approaches, does not require non-volatile storage of a biomet-
ric template/key. We propose a new paradigm called “Biometric Locking by
Obfuscation, Physically Unclonable Keys, and Reconfigurability” (BLOcKeR)
which provides low-cost template protection and attack resistance in match-on
card/device applications. A central element of BLOcKeR is hardware personal-
ization through reconfigurability. Aside from security benefits, the cost associated
with biometric systems is improved by adapting the pre-processing, feature ex-
traction, and post processing modules on a user-to-user basis.
1.5 Thesis Outline
The outline for the remainder of this thesis is as follows:
• Background
• Interval Optimized Mapping Bit Allocation (IOMBA)
• Noise Aware Optimized Mapping Bit Allocation (NA-IOMBA)
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• Presentation Attacks Against Electrocardiogram (ECG)
• Secure and Reliable Biometric Access Control for Resource-Constrained Sys-
tems
• Human Recognition from Photoplethysmography (PPG)
• Conclusions
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Electrocardiogram (ECG)
Electrocardiogram (ECG) is conventionally used in medical applications. For
instance, ECG can be used to diagnose cardiac diseases, which are the leading
causes of death in the world. Heart disease includes any disorder that affects
the heart’s ability to function normally. Over the last few decades, there has
been an increasing effort to develop computer-based automatic diagnostics of the
ECG [4], [56], [95], [53], [100]. More recently, ECG has been used for biometric
identification [76], [104], [16], [78]. The ECG signal is generated by electrical
current of the heart. The shapes of the ECG waveform depend on the anatomic
features of the human body and heart, and thus are distinctive from one person
to another.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the human heart and the signals responsible for gen-
erating a normal ECG signal. Each portion of a heartbeat produces a different
25
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Fig. 2.1: Action potential collected from each of the specialized cells found in
the heart, and their contribution to the primary heartbeat waveform.
deflection on the ECG. ECG signals are recorded as a series of positive and neg-
ative waves. The first peak (P wave) of the normal heartbeat is a small upward
wave which indicates atrial depolarization. Approximately 160ms after the onset
of the P wave, the QRS wave is caused by ventricle depolarization. Finally, one
observes the ventricular T wave in the electrocardiogram which represents the
stage of repolarization of the ventricles. We refer the reader to the book by Plon-
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Fig. 2.2: Normal ECG signal with P, QRS, and T wave.
sey [63] for a detailed description of the physiological and electrical properties of
the heart.
Note that the ECG signal shown in Figure 2.2 is considered as normal be-
cause it does not have significant arrhythmia. There are various forms of heart
disease i.e., arrhythmia, prolapsed mitral valve, coronary artery disease, congeni-
tal heart disease, etc. Such arrhythmias can cause significant changes to the ECG
morphology such as atrial fibrillation, Atrioventricular dissociation, and Ventric-
ular fibrillation. In such cases, the ECG signal is considered abnormal. Since
arrhythmias are present in a large portion of the population [35], biometrics meth-
ods for authentication and key generation based on the ECG signal should not
only be robust against general normal ECG noise but also cover abnormality ECG
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signal limitations and establishment of trustworthiness of communicating devices
to authenticate remote users and other embedded devices.
ECG sensor can be categorized as contact/contactless. Typically, in contact
ECG sensor, measurements are performed by the use of Ag/AgCl electrodes with
conductive gels in direct contact with the skin in order to transducer the body
surface ion current into an electron current [63]. Typically, the use of contact
standard electrodes requires a proper preparation of the body surface due to the
presence of body hair, abrasions or dirt. In order to overcome these drawbacks,
dry contact electrodes have been widely investigated for long-term heart moni-
toring applications [73]. In contrast to wet and dry contact sensors, non-contact
capacitive electrodes do not require an ohmic connection to the body where non-
contact electrodes have been considered as an alternative option with respect to
contact electrodes.
While ECG is typically recorded in a hospital using 15 electrodes placed on
the patient’s skin, it can also be measured using two electrodes, thus making it
feasible to record with wearable devices. ECG is the most commonly used vital
tools for monitoring patients’ physical condition and diagnosing diseases.
Many low-cost sensing devices have become available over the past few years
to measure the ECG signal as can be seen in Figure 2.3 (e.g., Kardia Mobile,
Nymi). The Nymi Band (see 2.3) is a wristband that incorporates an ECG sensor
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2.3: Acquisition of a electrocardiogram (ECG) using (a) Kardia Mobile, and
(b) Nymi band.
with two electrodes. The bottom electrode constantly touches the user’s wrist
while the band is worn. In order to allow ECG measurements (most commonly
for enrollment and authentication) the user touches the top electrode with the
index finger of their other hand. In this thesis, we only use two electrodes for
ECG authentication or key generation.
2.2 Photoplethysmography (PPG)
PPG is a particularly simple and low-cost optical technique that detects blood
volume changes in the blood vessels through measurements at the skin surface
which is indicated in Figure 2.4. PPG sensors are included in many different
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wearable devices today. Unlike ECG, PPG measurements only need to be acquired
from one side of the body, allowing it to be used in a larger number of human
recognition scenarios. In order to acquire PPG signal, a source of light, the
Fig. 2.4: Normal PPG signal with systolic and diastolic wave.
wavelength of which is λ, is placed on one side of the body (e.g. a finger) and
on the other side, a photo-detector is placed right across the source to see the
transmitted light.
A typical PPG signal consists of a large DC component passing through
the skin, muscle and bone without passing through the blood vessels, a small AC
component passing directly through the blood vessels by detaching itself from the
skin, muscle and bone and also a light passing through the arterial blood vessels.
Shortly after the systole, the amount of blood in the arteries increase, thus the
intensity of light received decreases. During the diastole, the amount of blood in
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2.5: Acquisition of a photoplethysmogram (PPG) using a pulse oximeter
attached to the fingertip (a) easy pulse sensor, and (b) MaxFast wear-
able.
the arteries decrease and an increase in the light transmittance is observed.
PPG signals have unique identity properties for human authentication, and
are becoming easier to capture by emerging IoT sensors such as MaxFast. An
example of PPG acquisition is shown in figure 2.5. MaxFast PPG sensors have
been used clinically to measure continuous oxygen saturation non-invasively. PPG
sensors are included in many different wearable devices today. Unlike ECG, PPG
measurements only need to be acquired from one side of the body, allowing it to
be used in a larger number of human recognition scenarios.
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2.3 Generic Biometric Authentication System
A generic biometric authentication system is divided into five subsystems: data
collection, transmission, signal processing, decision and data storage.
Data Collection : The user’s characteristic must be presented to a sensor. The
presentation of any biometric characteristic to the sensor introduces a behavioral
and psychological signal to every biometric method.
Transmission : Some, but not all, biometric systems collect data at one location
but store and/or process it at another. Such systems require data transmission.
Pre-processing : Having acquired and possibly transmitted a biometric char-
acteristic, we must prepare it for matching with other like measures. Since raw
data contain both high and low frequency noise components, therefore, high/low
pass filter pass been applied. Segmentation is the process of finding the biometric
pattern within the transmitted signal. For example, a ECG recognition system
must find the R peak of ECG signal that may contain periods of non-repeatable
signal. The raw biometric pattern, even after segmentation from the larger sig-
nal, contains non-repeatable distortions caused by the presentation, sensor and
transmission processes of the system which is called feature extraction.
In general, feature extraction is a form of non-reversible compression, mean-
ing that the original biometric image cannot be reconstructed from the extracted
features. The remaining system to be considered is that of storage. Templates or
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models from enrolled users will be stored in a database or device for comparison
by the pattern matcher to incoming feature samples. The decision subsystem im-
plements system policy by directing the database search, determines “matches”
or “non-matches” based on the distance or similarity measures received from the
pattern matcher, and ultimately makes an “accept/reject” decision based on the
system policy.
2.4 ECG/PPG Feature Types
We have divided the feature extraction methods into two major categories fiducial
point methods and non-fiducial methods which will be discussed below:
Fiducial Features: Fiducial methods use points of interest within a single heart-
beat waveform, such as local maxima or minima; these points are used as reference
to allow the definition of several time and amplitude features. Figure 2.6 shows an
example set of 35 fiducial features that are often extracted when analyzing ECGs.
Non-Fiducial Features: Non-fiducial techniques extract discriminative infor-
mation from the ECG/PPG waveform without localizing fiducial points. The
wavelet transform is a very popular technique for biomedical signal processing
due to the fact that it is lightweight and capable of providing time and frequency
information simultaneously. In wavelet transform, a linear operation transforms
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2.6: (a) Electrocardiogram (ECG) PQRST complex and fiducial character-
istic points, (b) 35 fiducial feature extracted for each ECG beat.
the ECG/PPG signal by decomposing it into various scales. The ECG/PPG sig-
nal is passed through a series of high and low pass filters in order to analyze both
high as well as low frequency components. The discrete wavelet transform (DWT)
is defined by
y[n] =
∞∑
k=−∞
x[k]ψ[n− k] (2.1)
where the x[k] represents the PPG signal under authentication.. The set of wavelet
functions is usually derived from the mother wavelet ψ(t) which is dilated by value
s = 2j, translated by constant τ = k × 2j, and normalized, where the j, k are
integers. A wavelet defined by the solution of a dilation follows [68]
ψj,k[t] =
1√
s
ψ[
t− τ
s
] =
1√
2j
φ[2−jt− k] (2.2)
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where, j is the dilation parameter, or the visibility in frequency, and k is the
parameter about the position.
The wavelet coefficients can be obtained by taking the inner product:
Vφ[j0, k] =
1√
M
∑
n
PPG[n]φj0,k[n] (2.3)
Wψ[j0, k] =
1√
M
∑
n
PPG[n]ψj,k[n] j0 ≤ k (2.4)
where φj0,k[n] and ψj,k[n] are discrete functions. {φj0,k[n]}k∈z and {ψj,k[n]}(j,k)∈z2,j≤j0
are orthogonal to each other. Equation 2.3 represents approximation coefficients
(CA) while Equation 2.4 denotes detailed coefficients (CD). CA and CD are used
as the non-fiducial feature vectors. For this purpose, we have investigated several
mother wavelet transforms, and found Coiflet to be the best.
2.5 Hardware Obfuscation
Hardware obfuscation encapsulates a series of techniques which lock a chip or
system by blocking its normal function at the hardware level until a correct key
is applied. Without a correct “key”, the device can be referred to as “locked”.
In the typical instantiation, only the designer can compute the key that unlocks
the device. Obfuscation techniques can be classified into three categories: logic
encryption (locking), logic permutation, and finite state machine (FSM) locking.
The logic encryption approach operates by inserting additional components
into the internal paths of combinational logic in the original (un-obfuscated) de-
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sign. These paths indicate the gate-level interconnections as shown in Fig. 2.7(a).
The additional components, such as exclusive or (XOR) and exclusive nor (XNOR)
gates, modify the internal value of a path based on the key. If the key is incor-
rect, the logic value becomes inverted, thus creating an incorrect behavior in the
design. Typically, a large number n of additional components (32, 64, 128, etc.)
are inserted; thus, creating 2n possible key combinations. Besides XOR/XNOR
gates, modified look-up table (LUTs), which can involve even more key bits per
additional component, can be utilized. Compared with logic encryption, logic
permutation alters the order of the interconnections instead of changing their
values.
An example of system-level obfuscation is presented in Fig. 2.7(b). The key-
controlled multiplexer (question mark box) conceals the interconnections among
integrated circuits (ICs). The finite-state machine (FSM) based technique [9]
embeds additional states into the original FSM as shown in Fig. 2.7(c). In order
to unlock the design, a designated key input pattern navigates the FSM from the
obfuscated state space to the original state space where the device is unlocked.
2.6 Physical Unclonable Functions
PUF, is a “digital fingerprint” that serves as a unique identity for a semiconduc-
tor device such as a microprocessor. Like a biometric which expresses a human’s
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Fig. 2.7: (a) Logic encryption; (b) logic permutatio, (c) FSM based on obfusca-
tion.
identity, a PUF is an expression of an inherent and unclonable instance-specific
feature of a physical object. For integrate circuits (ICs), these instance-specific
features are induced by manufacturing process variations such as the size of tran-
sistors, capacitors, resistors and other components and can be captured by the
input/output or challenge/response pairs (CRPs) of the PUF.
These random process variations can be used to our advantage if we use
them to generate unique intrinsic identifiers. This is the idea behind Physically
Unclonable Functions (PUFs), which was first proposed by Gassend et al. in
2002 [34].
The challenge/response relationship can be viewed as a physical one-way
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function which provides the design with a non-invertible output. Also, due to
IC-to-IC process variations, the CRPs are unique to each device. We refer to this
property later as non-linkability.
Chapter 3
Interval Optimized Mapping Bit Allocation (IOMBA)
Nowadays, cryptographic keys are widely used in information technology (IT)
applications, especially those dealing with sensitive/private information (retail,
finance, medical, military, etc.). Cryptographic technology is primarily employed
to preserve confidentiality of information, verify that information was not changed
after it was sent (i.e., integrity), and authenticate the originator of the information.
For example, asymmetric keys can be used for digital signatures to provide ori-
gin authentication, assurance of data integrity, and/or signatory non-repudiation.
Cryptography relies on two principal components: cryptographic algorithms and
cryptographic keys. Cryptographic algorithms are publically known, but are de-
signed around computational hardness assumptions which ensure that they are
difficult to break without knowledge of the cryptographic key.
Cryptographic keys must be kept secret and also possess certain properties
(long length, high entropy, etc.). Traditional passwords or user-determined PINs
are commonly used for access control, but are not appropriate for keys. Passwords
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are rarely long enough for cryptographic applications since they would be difficult
for user to remember. This issue is only augmented by the fact that distinct
passwords are often needed for different services. Finally, passwords can be stolen,
guessed, or hacked, and then fraudulently used without the user knowledge.
Human biometrics have been proposed as a promising alternative due to
their intrinsic nature. Electrocardiogram (ECG) is an emerging biometric that
is extremely difficult to forge and circumvent, but has not yet been heavily in-
vestigated for cryptographic key generation. ECG has challenges with respect to
immunity to noise, abnormalities, etc. In this chapter, we propose a novel key
generation approach that extracts keys from real-valued ECG features with high
reliability and entropy in mind. Our technique, called interval optimized mapping
bit allocation (IOMBA), is applied to normal and abnormal ECG signals under
multiple session conditions. We also investigate IOMBA in the context of differ-
ent feature extraction methods, such as wavelet, discrete cosine transform, etc.,
to find the best method for feature extraction.
3.1 Biometric Key Generation
Since external biometrics are easy to mimic or forge, internal biometrics modalities
are more promising in this regard. The interior group includes DNA [55], brain
signal (EEG) [81], electrocardiogram (ECG), and photoplethysmogram (PPG).
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Poon et al. [77] proposed the use of Inter-Pulse-Interval (IPI) to generate crypto-
graphic keys. 128 IPIs were measured taking about 60 seconds each by computing
the time difference between the peaks from two sources: ECG and PPG. Due to
the noise in these physiological signals, generating binary values by this approach
can result in high error. Symmetric cryptographic key has been proposed by Kr-
ishna et al. [101] based on PPG as well. They applied PPG features to enable
two sensors to agree on a common key. Once the features were generated, one of
the two communicating sensors generates a random symmetric key which it then
hides using the feature vector obtained from the PPG signal. Another research
that uses ECG signal to generate cryptographic keys is reported in [32]. While
they were able to obtain 240 bit keys after applying error correction code, the
false accept rate (FAR) and false reject rate (FRR) are still 4.6% and 7.9%. All
that said, a major concern about ECG is its permanence, i.e., stability over long
periods of time. In [71], the authors evaluated the tendency of ECG variability
over time and claimed that signals have not substantially changed. Current re-
search on ECG for biometric authentication also seems to support this claim [54],
[2], [89].
To achieve higher reliability in authentication and/or key generation, error
correcting codes (ECC) and fuzzy extraction have been proposed [32], [43]. Such
approaches correct up to a certain number of errors in terms of hamming distance
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from the original biometrics key/template, but with an unavoidable loss of entropy.
Fuzzy extraction introduce potential drawbacks such as high computational cost,
increased area overhead, and vulnerability to side channel attacks (such as timing,
power analysis and etc.) [45]. This encourages us to propose new approaches to
generate keys from biometric features to achieve high key entropy and reliability.
By extension, these would also be useful for user identification.
3.2 ECG Authentication
In general, ECG biometric authentication and identification can be categorized
based on feature extraction, classification and multimodal framework. Fiducial
features and non-fiducial features are popular methods for feature extraction.
SVM, neural network, KNN are the types of classifiers. In addition, combination
of ECG with other biometric modalities for human recognition have been used as
discussed in [70].
3.2.1 Pre-processing Steps
Typical biometric systems require pre-processing and features extraction stages.
In this section, we describe the unique processing and feature selection algorithms
required for ECG. In the pre-processing stage, ECG signals are filtered to remove
noise which can impact the biometric signal. The main types of ECG noise are
43
low frequency and high frequency noise components, also commonly referred to
as baseline drift and power line interference respectively. High frequency noise
contains muscle artifacts and external interference. Electromyogram (EMG) is
generated from electrical activity of the muscles and appears as rapid fluctuations
which are much faster than the ECG waves. Low-pass filters on the ECG are
used to remove high frequency noise. A high pass filter can remove low-frequency
components such as motion artifacts, respiratory variation, and baseline wander
noise. In addition to these, physical stress and exercise can change the heart rate
variability (HRV) and morphology. For example, the heart rate can be calculated
as the reciprocal of the R-R interval (i.e., time difference between two R peaks).
As the heart rate increases, the QT interval will shorten much more than the rest
of the intervals. This change can be corrected by normalizing the QT interval
according to the heart rate [33].
In this chapter, we have employed 4th Butterworth band pass filter with
cutoff frequency 1Hz-40Hz to eliminate various kinds of noise in ECG signals
based on empirical results. After filtering, R peak detection is generally required
to segment individual heart beats and analyze the ECG signal. In this chapter,
we use the R peak detection algorithm proposed by Pan-Tompkins [72]. Then,
we consider a fixed window by taking an identified R peak as a reference to
segment the ECG signal in terms of RR interval (RR). For simplicity, we have not
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considered the QT interval correction discussed above.
3.2.2 Feature Extraction Approaches
(1) Discrete Wavelet Transforms (DWT): The discrete wavelet transform is
a popular technique for time and frequency analysis. The non-stationary nature of
ECG signals allow one to expand basic functions created by scaling and shifting of
a single prototype function referred to as the mother wavelet. DWT is essentially
a convolution of the wavelet function with the original signal.
Different wavelet families, such as Biorthogonal, Coiflet, Haar, Symmlet,
Daubechies [62], etc., exist in the literature and have been used for feature extrac-
tion. Haar wavelet is the simplest type of wavelet. Like all wavelet transforms, the
Haar transform decomposes a discrete signal into two sub-signals of half its length.
In this work, different levels of Haar function have been examined, among all of
them, 7 level decomposition achieves the best in terms of key length and reliability.
Haar has the advantage of being simple to compute and easy to understand, but
some information cannot be captured. Daubechies wavelet is conceptually more
complicated than Haar and has higher computational overhead, but can pick up
details which are missed by the Haar wavelet.
In this work, we found that “Db9” was the best among different Daubechies
scales. The Coifman wavelet system is an orthogonal multiresolution wavelet sys-
45
tem with vanishing moments not only for the wavelet functions, but also for the
scaling functions. Based on our experiments, the fifth-order Coiflet (“coif5”) with
5 level decomposition is the best for feature extraction. The Biorthogonal fam-
ily contains biorthogonal compactly supported spline wavelets. It uses separate
wavelet and scaling functions for the analysis and synthesis of a signal.
Our experiments demonstrate that “bior6.8” with 6 level decomposition
is the best for feature extraction. Another feature extraction method that has
been used in the literature is the maximal overlap discrete wavelet transform
(MODWT) [32]. The MODWT is similar to the DWT in that both produce a set
of time-dependent wavelet and scaling coefficients. The differences between DWT
and MODWT are the highly redundant and non-orthogonal transforms that exist
in MODWT. MODWT has the advantage of keeping the downsampled values at
each level of the decomposition that would otherwise be discarded by the DWT.
It also has the higher effective degrees of freedom on each scale compared to DWT
[74].
The optimal choice of the wavelet function depends on the application. For
instance, if an ECG signal is not well represented by one order of wavelet trans-
form, another wavelet transform might be better. In this chapter, the best wavelet
transform for feature extraction from ECG is chosen according to three criteria:
Key length, min-entropy, and reliability.
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ECG signal is a non-stationary signal and is distorted by several noise
sources (motion artifact, baseline drift, EMG). The noise generates variation for
each feature value at different times. Therefore, feature extraction will be im-
pacted by noise tolerance which can generated an error in the reliability. DWTs
are defined by using the convolution of the high-pass and low-pass filters with
a signal to produce approximation and detail coefficients. Local behavior of the
ECG signal is expected to be well captured by Daubechies wavelet transform due
to properties of the vanish moments and support width.
Since scale function of Daubechies wavelet transform is similar to ECG
signal, hence, we can conclude that Daubechies wavelet filter is likely better than
other techniques. Based on our experiments (see Section 3.4.5, 3.4.2, 3.4.2 and
supplemental material), we have found that the MODWT, DCT, and Biorthogonal
are the best feature extraction methods for multiple session, abnormal ECGs, and
normal ECGs respectively.
(2) Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT): DCT converts an ECG signal from
time domain to frequency domain by the following equation
A(k) =
N−1∑
i=0
x(i)cos(
pik
2N
(2i+ 1)) (3.1)
where x(i) is the ECG signal and A(k) is the DCT coefficient. In practice, we
have found that most of the signal energy is compressed into the first several
coefficients with the remaining coefficients near zero.
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(3) Normalize-Convolute Normalize (NCN): Normalize-Convolute Normal-
ize is proposed in [88] for improved identification of individuals with abnormal
ECGs. The approach focuses on the QRS complex which is more invariant than
other peaks over time. It begins by detecting the R peak. Then an equal number
of sample points from both sides of the identified R wave are selected. We refer
the reader to [88] for more details.
Experimental results for non-fiducial approaches have shown high identifica-
tion accuracy, but only when ECG measurements from the same session are used
for training and identification. For example, [70] showed that all existing feature
selection and classification approaches suffer significant performance degradation
when measurements from different sessions are used. This motivates us to inves-
tigate more reliable approaches for ECG-based key generation.
3.3 ECG-based Key Generation
3.3.1 Overview of Proposed Approach
In this chapter, we introduce a novel technique for key generation called interval
optimized mapping bit allocation (IOMBA). Our approach has several salient
features. First, the most reliable features for each person are determined by an
enrollment step and only these features are used for key generation. This differs
from most techniques which try to use all the features, even unreliable ones.
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In short, the features are selected based on population statistics and an
individual’s feature variance. Note that this will result in different key lengths
per person in the population. Second, each feature that is selected as reliable can
be quantized into one or more bits. This can increase the key length provided
there is enough margin to do so. Once again, this is a function of population
statistics. Third, both the reliable features and bit length for each feature are
stored as helper data to re-generate the key later on.
Note that the helper data only specifies the features and does not leak
information in our approach. The feature space is quantized in such a way that
every possible bit combination is equally likely for a feature. For instance, when
quantizing to one bit, the probability of ‘0’ and ‘1’ are equal. When quantizing to
two bits, the probability of ‘00’, ‘01’, ‘11’, and ‘10’ are equal. And so forth. More
details on quantization and IOMBA will be given below.
Figure 3.1 demonstrates the flow for the registration enrollment and key
generation processes in our approach. During registration, the raw ECG signal is
captured by an electrocardiogram sensing device. Many low-cost sensing devices
have become available over the past few years (e.g., Nymi [69]). Pre-processing is
applied to remove baseline drift, electromyography (EMG), etc. from the ECG.
Then the feature extraction methods (see Section 4.3.2) are applied to the filtered
ECG signals. The resulting features may have correlation. Therefore, correla-
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tion reduction is applied upon ECG features. Next, IOMBA is used to generate
unique, reliable, and high entropy keys from individuals. The binary encoding
from features which are based on IOMBA algorithm are transformed into the
template. Since IOMBA features may differ from one person to another, the in-
dices corresponding to the selected features must also be stored as helper data for
later use.
User Template
Feature extractionPre-processing
Registration Process
Document
User
Authentication
Signature Process
ECG Key 
Helper Data
Correlation reduction
Quantization
Helper Data
Quantization
Feature extractionPre-processing Correlation reduction
Fig. 3.1: ECG key generation block diagram.
During authentication, an enrolled user supplies an ECG to the biometrics
system. The signal is pre-processed and features are extracted. The helper data
is used to select the reliable features and quantize them to form the key. The
key can be used to authenticate the individual by comparing it to a template.
This would require storing the template in a suitable storage medium such as a
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database on a disk storage device or on a portable device such as a smart card.
Alternatively, the key can simply be used to encrypt, decrypt, or digitally sign
messages.
3.3.2 Analyzing Quantization Approaches
Figure 3.2 demonstrates the general quantization concept where each feature is
converted to one or more bits. It is assumed that samples from the entire popula-
tion are able to characterize the background probability density function (PDF) of
every feature. The background PDF is considered Gaussian with zero mean and
unit standard deviation, i.e., N (0, 1). As illustrated in Figure 3.2, each feature
can be quantized based on the number of bins (b) selected. In the case of two bins,
the feature can be encoded into binary [0, 1] based on which side of the threshold
(dash line) it lies. In the case of four bins, a feature is encoded into [00, 01, 11, 10]
and so forth.
A number of bit extraction methods based on quantization and coding have
been proposed in biometric applications. Binary quantization of biometric data
was first proposed by Daugman [22] for iris authentication. Later, Tuyls et al.
considered binary quantization in practical secret key generation [98].
Chen et al. proposed quantization of a real valued vector of biometric fea-
tures to a binary string by introducing detection rate optimized bit allocation
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(DROBA) [14] and quantization of element pairs in the polar domain [13] which
was multi-level quantizer based on likelihood ratio. They used fixed quantization
where each bin contains 2b background probability mass. In [57], DROBA was
improved by using dynamic search. However, none of the prior approaches choose
bins in such a way that both reliability and randomness are considered.
Fig. 3.2: Plots illustrating fixed quantization boundaries of a feature for (a) one
bit and (b) two bits quantization cases. The solid signal refers to the
probability distribution of a biometric feature for the entire population.
The dotted signal refers to the probability distribution of the same
biometric feature in the presence of noise for a specific individual in
the population.
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3.3.3 IOMBA Quantization Assumptions and Approach
In this section, we present our module that aims to transform the real valued ECG
features into an adaptive length binary string. Unfortunately, the ECG signal
suffers from noise, which may result in key generation errors. In general, the
performance in biometric authentication is determined by two kinds of variability
among the acquired biometric templates. The first one is variability within the
subjects (i.e., intra-class variation) which determines minimum false reject rate
(FRR) and variability between subjects (i.e., inter-class variation), whose lower
limit sets a minimum false accept rate (FAR).
Clearly, it is desirable for a biometric key generation systems to have max-
imal variability between subjects but minimal variability within subjects vari-
ability. The ideal case for biometric-based key generation is that the standard
deviation of the features within the subject are close to zero. On the other hand,
standard deviation of the features between the subjects should be large enough
so that keys from different subjects are sufficiently random and unpredictable.
For key generation, the sources of errors are the same. So far, the quan-
tization methods in the bit extraction module that have been proposed cannot
completely eliminate intra-class variation. However, the module we present allows
tradeoff between these sources of variation. Specifically, the allowable amount of
intra-class variation can be tuned. The more (lesser) variations allowed per fea-
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ture, the longer (shorter) the key and lesser (higher) the reliability.
Before discussing the details of IOMBA, we specify our assumptions:
1. The ECG statistics for the population are known, Gaussian, and normalized.
We denote this PDF as PDFpop,f = N (µ = 0, σ = 1) for each ECG feature
f .
2. The ECG statistics for each individual are computed during enrollment, are
Gaussian, and normalized with respect to the population statistics. In order
to incorporate the average noise statistics for features, we record the max σ
of the population for each feature as σ∗f .
The above simplifying assumptions are commonly made in this chapter.
We will justify them for ECG and show how correlation between features can be
removed for ECG in the next subsection. Note that although we apply IOMBA
technique on ECG, our approach can be extended to different types of biometric
such as iris, fingerprint, etc. provided that same assumptions hold.
Our approach for quantizing features to two bits is most clearly illustrated
in Figure 3.3. The population PDF of a feature is shown in blue. The PDFs for
the same feature in three subjects are shown. We have several input parameters
which can be used to trade off reliability and entropy as well as output parameters
which will be used to select “reliable” features. Note that all our parameters
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are illustrated on the left side of the PDF, but the right side will have similar
parameters due to symmetry of the zero-mean normal distribution.
Outputs: There are two types of outputs of our algorithm/module- quantization
thresholds and margins. In Figure 3.3, the thresholds are shown with dash-dotted
lines at points on the x-axis. One point is 0 and the other we denote by T . In our
approach, if a feature is selected as ‘reliable’, these thresholds are used to encode
it as ‘00’, ‘01’, etc. This is conceptually similar to the existing quantization
approaches (shown in Figure 3.2), except that in our approach thresholds are
determined for optimal reliability and entropy for every given ECG feature in the
space. In addition, our second type of output is the margin µ, which determines
the range of values in which we would consider the feature as reliable (based on
noise statistics). From µ and T , we can compute µ00 = T −µ, µleft,01 = T +µ, and
µright,01 = 0− µ. These are shown as dashed lines on the x-axis in the figure. If a
feature from a subject is on the left side of µ00 it would be considered as reliable.
Similarly, a feature from a subject lies between µleft,01 and µright,01, it would also be
considered as reliable. Both the thresholds and margins will be computed based
on desired reliability and entropy parameters.
Reliability Parameter (β): Our first input to the module is a reliability pa-
rameter. The inset of Figure 3.3, shows the overlap between a user’s feature PDF
and the T threshold. The amount of overlap indicates the amount of error that
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Fig. 3.3: Schematic for optimization of quantization with two bit.
we can expect if the feature is chosen for the user’s key. For instance, for the
subject on the right side of T , the feature will be correctly encoded as ‘01’ during
key generation when the feature is measured to be on the right of T . However,
due to noise, there will be an error encoding the feature if it appears on the left
of T . We will refer to the maximum allowable overlap for a reliable feature as β.
Thus, β controls the probability of error in (or reliability of) the key generation.
For the two bit encoding case, only features that satisfy the following constraints
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can be selected for key generation
∫ ∞
T
PDFf,i ≤ β, if µf,i < T (3.2)∫ T
−∞
PDFf,i ≤ β ∩
∫ ∞
0
PDFf,i ≤ β, if T < µf,i < 0 (3.3)
where µf,i denotes the mean for feature f of subject i. Note that similar constraints
can be specified for µf,i > 0 , but are withheld for brevity. Note based on our
definitions above, the constraints can also be written as
µf,i ≤ µ00, if µf,i < T (3.4)
µleft,01 ≤ µf,i ≤ µright,01, if T < µf,i < 0 (3.5)
Entropy Parameter (α): Achieving high entropy requires that each bit value in
the key be equally probable. In the case of our approach, this can also be restated
that each feature is quantized into different bins (e.g., ‘00’, ‘01’, ‘11’, and ‘10’
for two bit case) with equal probability. For instance, let P00 and P01 denote the
probability of a feature falling into bins ‘00’ and ‘01’ respectively. In our notation,
these can be expressed as
P00 =
∫ µ00
−∞
PDFpop,fdx (3.6)
P01 =
∫ µright,10
µleft,00
PDFpop,fdx (3.7)
Although P00 = P01 is ideal, it may be too restrictive in practice. As a result,
it may not be possible to find thresholds and parameters to fulfill this condition,
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resulting in very few features for key generation. To relax this constraint, we
introduce the entropy parameter α along with the following constraint
P01
P00
≤ α (3.8)
Intuitively, α can be increased (decreased) in order to bias the probability of a
feature appearing in bin ‘01’ (‘00’). By choosing α = 1, we can return to the more
restrictive requirement P00 = P01.
With the above input parameters and constraints in mind, it is possible to
calculate optimal T and µ for a given feature. Our approach for the two bit case
is as follows. We begin with the normalized Gaussian function
G(x) =
1√
2piσ
e−
x2
2σ2 (3.9)
and the definite integral ∫ ∞
0
e−ax
2
dx =
1
2
√
pi
a
(3.10)
The relation between the normalized Gaussian distribution and the error function
are defined
erf(
x
σ
√
2
) =
∫ x
−x
G(x)dx (3.11)
Therefore the Equations 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 can be expressed as follows:
1 + erf(T−µ√
2
)
erf −µ√
2
− erf(T+µ√
2
)
≤ α (3.12)
erf(
µ
σ∗f
√
2
) ≥ 1− 2β (3.13)
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where σ∗f indicates the worst case standard deviation that has been achieved for
entire population for feature f . By using σ∗f in the formulation, we account for the
worst case noise. However, one could also consider average case in our formulation
if desired. The above system of equations can be solved for the optimal T and
µ for each feature f . Then, for any given ECG, the features that satisfy the
constraints above will be selected for each individual. If a feature does not fulfill
the constraints, it can be discarded. The indices of features for each individual
can be stored as helper data as discussed in Section 3.3.1. Note that helper data
will not leak much information provided that α is selected to be close to 1.
Note that the above formulation applies to the two bit case, but this ap-
proach can also be extended to three bits, four bits, etc. In practice, for each
feature one can quantize to the maximum number of bits based on the input
reliability and entropy parameters, β and α.
To better understand IOMBA, we have illustrated it in Figure 3.4. Phase
I of IOMBA is a pre-processing phase. During phase I, optimal margins and
thresholds are calculated based on inputs α (reliability parameter), β (entropy
parameter), and population statistics. Phase II is an enrollment phase which
occurs one time for every user. In phase II, the user’s ECG is taken as the
primary input, noise is removed by standard pre-processing techniques, features
are extracted, and uncorrelated features are removed (see Section 3.3.4 for more
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Fig. 3.4: Block diagrams show for IOMBA margin calculation, IOMBA ECG
enrollment and IOMBA ECG key reconstruction phase.
details). The margins and thresholds for each feature (calculated in phase I) are
then used to select the most reliable features from the user’s ECG and quantize it
into a high entropy key. The indexes of the selected features are stored as helper
data for later. In addition, one can also include an optional fuzzy extraction GEN
step to generate additional helper data that later corrects errors in the key. The
key reconstruction is phase III. Here, the ECG signal undergoes the same initial
steps as phase II. However, the feature indices determined from phase II are
applied as an IOMBA quantization input to extract the same features as before.
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Finally, if necessary, fuzzy extractor REP can be used along with additional helper
date to reconstruct the key without any errors. Note that while fuzzy extraction
may be needed, the number of errors is expected to be dramatically reduced by
IOMBA resulting in lesser overhead and loss in security.
3.3.4 Support of Assumptions
Previous works for biometric-based key generation assume that the biometric fea-
tures are uncorrelated and independent, but in practice some correlation may exist
between the features. This limitation can allow attackers to more easily break the
system. In addition, it does not allow one to accurately measure entropy. To
address this issue, we apply following procedure to remove correlation between
the ECG features.
Correlation Assumption: It is always possible to remove the correlation be-
tween feature components with a linear transformation, even if the relationship
between the feature components are nonlinear [40]. To remove the correlation, the
covariance matrix has been calculated from n feature components with m subjects
that need to be zero. Let X be a matrix where Xi,j is the j
th feature of subject
i. To transform every feature for all the subjects to zero mean, let Zm,m be an
m by m square matrix. The D matrix, where the data in X is represented as
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zero-mean, can be computed as follows:
D = X − 1
m
Zm,mX (3.14)
Then the data in D may be transformed to T where the variables will be uncor-
related [19]
T = D(DTD)−0.5 (3.15)
where an exponent of −1
2
represents the matrix square root of the inverse of a
matrix.
Gaussian Assumption: In practice, we’ve found that some feature extraction
techniques result in a portion of ECG features that are non-Gaussian across the
population. In our case, we identify these features by performing standards tests
on the population statistics (PDFpop,f ) for each feature. Those features that fail
are removed from further consideration and not used by IOMBA.
Independence Assumptions: Note that while the transformed features are
uncorrelated, they may not be independent in general. However, for the case when
samples are drawn from a multi-variate Gaussian distribution, they can be proven
as independent. We apply the Henze-Zirkler test [19] to our transformed ECG
data in order to test for multivariate normality. The test procedure is based on
the computation of a defined test statistic that is a function distance of the given
data and whose asymptotic distribution is known if the data follows a multivariate
normal distribution. The statistic can be compared to the asymptotic distribution
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to test whether the data set can be reasonably assumed to be normal. Based on
this test, p values can be calculated using the statistic computed and determine
the null hypothesis multivariate normality is true. For more detail information,
we refer to [19].
From the test results, if the p-values is greater than 0.05, it means the data
is Gaussian. For a subset of the ECG data (mentioned in Section IV) the p-
value from the on Henze-Zirkler test for normal, abnormal, and BioSec.Lab ECGs
database are 0.5203, 0.3557, and 0.7630 respectively. Therefore, since the data are
uncorrelated and have normality characteristic, we can assume that the features
are independent.
While some prior work exists in biometric-based key generation, there is lit-
tle work focused on ECG. Our literature survey only revealed one paper. In 2009,
Garcia-Baleon et al. [32] used a 4-level symlet8 wavelet transform and applied a
Boolean function to encode the raw feature into the binary. Overall, they were
able to extract 240 bits keys from the ECG. However, their technique possessed
an intra-class error around 24% and, therefore, Hadamard Code was required for
error correction. Even with Hadamard, the false accept rate (FAR) is still quite
high (4.6%).
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3.4 Experimental Results and Discussion
3.4.1 Experimental Setup
In this section, we evaluate the proposed IOMBA approach as follows.
Databases: We use ECG data obtained from publically available databases -
(1) PTB Diagnostic, which is offered from National Metrology Institute Germany
[71] and (2) BioSec.Lab database from the University of Toronto [54], [2], [3]. The
PTB database contains a large collection of healthy and diseased ECG signals,
thereby allowing us to test our approach on normal and abnormal ECGs. PTB
contains 549 records from 290 subjects, 52 of which have healthy (normal) ECGs 1.
BioSec.Lab database contains ECGs that were recorded at 200Hz frequency from
13 individuals in two separate sessions (which took place several weeks apart).
The BioSec.Lab database allows us to test the reliability of our key generation
under more extreme conditions.
Feature Selection : To evaluate our approaches for key generation, we consider
all the feature selection methods previously discussed. We found that Daub9,
DCT, and MODWT performed the best for normal, abnormal, and multi-session
cases respectively. For brevity, we only discuss the best results here. Additional
1 Note that while we would like to test our approach on a larger population, this is the largest
number (with a consistent measurement setup in PTB) that we could obtain.
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results for the remaining feature selection approaches are contained in the supple-
mentary material.
Quantization : After feature selection, we remove any non-Guassian features (as
discussed in Section 3.3.4) and apply interval optimized mapping bit allocation
(IOMBA) to encode the real values into binary. We applied dynamic quantization
with maximum number of bits per feature as three for simplicity. α and β pa-
rameters were varied to illustrate the tradeoff between key reliability and entropy.
Evaluation Metrics : Since our primary focus is key generation (where even
one bit error cannot be tolerated), the metrics typically used for biometric au-
thentication (false accept rate, false reject rate, equal error rate, etc.) are not
appropriate. To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we record the length
of key per person and use the following metrics to capture key reliability and
entropy:
1) Reliability : In this work, we segment the ECG signal into individual
heart beats via R peak detection. A key is generated from a portion of these
segments of the ECG signal. If all bits generated by the remaining ECG segments
of an individual are equal to the associated key, it can be considered as reliable.
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Thus, intra-hamming distance is used to compute key reliability:
IntraHD =
1
S
S∑
i=1
HD(Refi, ki,t)
n
× 100% (3.16)
where Refi is the reference key (average several segments of a sample) and ki,t
is the key derived from the tth segment of the ECG. Intra-HD shows the average
number of unreliable bits. The reliability can be quantified as:
Reliability = 100%− IntraHD (3.17)
Ideally, the reliability value should be 100%. This is expected to happen when β
from Equation 3.13 is chosen as near zero.
2) Entropy : To measure key randomness, we calculate the min-entropy.
Min-entropy is used as the conservative measure of the strength of the key and
should be large enough to resist against attacks. In this chapter, we calculate the
min-entropy of a feature k as follows
H∞(k) = −ξ log2(max
i
{Pi(k)}) (3.18)
where Pi(k) = Pr(X = i) for the kth feature of a subject. Note that i ∈
{0, 1},{00, 01, 10, 11}, and {000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110, 111} for features that
are quantized to one bit, two bits, and three bits respectively. ξ is a normalizing
parameter set equal to 1, 1
2
and 1
3
for 1-bit, 2-bit, and 3-bit cases. Note that the
maximum min-entropy (1) occurs when Pi =
1
2n
∀i, where the n indicates number
of bits for quantization.
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As appropriate, we will examine the average min-entropy across qualifying
subjects2 for features with 1-bit, 2-bit, and 3-bit cases separately. In certain
instances, we will also examine the average min-entropy of all features across all
qualifying subjects regardless of quantization length.
Hmin =
1
m
m∑
k=1
H∞(k) (3.19)
If the min-entropy is close to 1, this means that the adversary has the smallest
chance of guessing the correct key in the first try. For estimating the min-entropy,
the features need to be independent and have enough samples. Note that Equa-
tion 3.19 is a reasonable estimate since the key bits are uncorrelated after applying
our process as demonstrated in the previous section. Note also that if the number
of qualifying subjects is too small, the min-entropy might be lower than expected.
For instance, if we have less than 15 samples (qualifying subjects), then the maxi-
mum min-entropy will not become greater than 0.9. Additional supporting details
are shown in Section 3.4.6.
Figure 3.5 contains the results for normal ECGs. Our approach was applied
with different β parameters and the α parameter held to a constant value of 1.
Figure 3.5 (a) is a box plot showing the statistics of the key length as β varies.
For relatively small β, the average key length in the population is about 200 bits
2 By qualifying subjects, we refer to those with a feature that satisfies all reliability (β) and
min-entropy (α) constraints.
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in length while the minimum is 40 bits. As β is increased, the constraints on
reliability become more relaxed allowing for longer keys. For β = 0.2, the average
key length is almost 3 times longer than for β = 0.01. The maximum number of
bits achieved for any individual is 900 bits.
Figures 3.5 (b-c) contain the reliability statistics and min-entropy with vary-
ing β. With increasing β, the reliability decreases as expected. The maximum
reliability is about 99.9% and occurs at the minimum β = 0.01. In the worst
case (including outliers), the reliability is never worse than 96%. Figure 3.5 (c)
shows the average min-entropy for 1-bit, 2-bit, and 3-bit cases. The 1-bit case
has the largest min-entropy, but this is a bit misleading. Among all three cases,
it requires the least amount of samples and also has the most number of samples
(see Figure 3.5 (d)). As β increases, the average min-entropy for three bit case
increases since more features qualify for the calculation (i.e., there are more sam-
ples). With additional samples (see Section 3.4.6), we expect the min-entropy for
all cases to increase. Overall, our results have better reliability and larger number
of key bits compared to [32] (only 240 key bits at most with 4.6% FAR).
Figure 3.5 (d) is a bar graph illustrating the average percentage of bits in
the key obtained for 1-bit, 2-bit, and 3-bit from the features. For small β, the
constraints do not allow many features to be quantized into three bits. As β
increases, the constraints become more relaxed. The number of bits extracted as
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3.5: Box plots for normal ECGs of the population corresponding to (a) key
length, and (b) reliability, (c) shows bar graph for min-entropy based
on 1-bit, 2-bit and 3-bit cases. (d) shows the distribution of key bit
quantization.
1-bit stays relatively constant with β, but the number of 2-bit and 3-bit cases
increase significantly. By including even greater levels of quantization (4-bit, 5-
bit, etc.), we may be able to increase the length of the keys even further without a
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loss in reliability. The conventional approaches in the literature do not have this
flexibility.
3.4.2 Abnormal ECG Results
We applied the same approach to abnormal ECG signals from the PTB database
and the results are shown in Figure 3.6. Compared to the normal ECG case,
abnormal signals are more chaotic and therefore have larger intra-class variation
resulting in less reliable features. This made it more difficult to determine thresh-
olds for each feature and to enroll users. In fact, we were not able to perform
enrollment assuming worst case variance so average case was used instead.
The average key length (shown in Figure 3.6 (a)) is dramatically reduced
compared to normal ECG case. Keys are on the order of 10’s of bits rather than
100’s or 1000’s. Reliability (shown in Figure 3.6 (b)) is also lower on average with
much larger variance. Aside from the noise in abnormal ECGs, we also attribute
this to the fact that average case variance was used for enrollment. Since the
number of individuals with abnormal ECGs are larger than normal ECGs in the
PTB database, the min-entropy is larger than normal ECG as can be seen in
(Figure 3.6 (c)). As a result, there are more samples for the 3-bit case resulting in
higher average min-entropy than the previous case. Since is difficult to capture the
trends with β in Figures 3.6 (b-c), we’ve illustrated the average reliability and min-
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3.6: Box plots for abnormal ECGs of the population corresponding to (a)
key length, and (b) reliability, (c) shows bar graph for min-entropy
based on 1-bit, 2-bit and 3-bit cases. (d) shows the distribution of key
bit quantization.
entropy verses β in Figure 3.8(a). The reliability decreases with β as expected.
However, the min-entropy increases with β. β is not supposed to impact min-
entropy which at first glance is a surprising result. However, we attribute this
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to the lower number of samples per feature (less qualifying subjects) for small β
compared to larger β. With more samples and qualifying subjects, we expect the
impact of β to be smaller (see Section 3.4.6).
3.4.3 Multiple Session Results
We also investigated key generation results for normal ECGs under multiple ses-
sion from the BioSec.Lab database. User ECGs were enrolled using the first ses-
sion’s data, and then keys were re-generated based on ECGs taken during a second
measurement session. Figure 3.7 shows the key length, reliability, min-entropy,
and distribution of bits for different β. Note that since the sampling rate, sensors
used, etc. to acquire the ECG signals is different between the BioSec.Lab database
and PTB database, we expect some differences from the above results.
The trends with β are very similar to those from the PTB database. One
major difference is that it was very difficult to obtain 3 bit features for most values
of β. The raw signals of the BioSec.Lab database must contain larger variability
than the PTB database. As a result, the length of keys is shorter with a median
around 100 bits and average around 150 bits. Even with the larger variability,
we note that the reliability is still very high for small β (median around 95%).
This is only slightly less than for the single session case, which is unexpected since
the additional variability between ECGs in multiple sessions is not captured by
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3.7: Box plots for normal ECGs of the population (enrolled in first session
and tested in second session) corresponding to (a) key length, (b) reli-
ability. (c) Shows the bar graph for min-entropy based on 1-bit, 2-bit
and 3-bit cases. (d) shows the distribution of key bit quantization.
IOMBA’s enrollment process. The average min-entropy is also lower than other
cases. However, since the number of individuals in the databases is small (13), it
is difficult to draw a conclusion from this. The reason of low min-entropy that has
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been achieved from all conditions ECGs is the lower sample size in the enrollment
process e.g., abnormal ECG has higher samples between all databases. Figure
3.7(d) shows that it was more difficult to quantize to larger number of bits. We
attribute this to the noise contained this database. As in the previous cases, with
increasing β, the number of the key bits that are allocated two bits and three bits
increases.
3.4.4 Parameter Tradeoffs
One of the biggest advantages of our scheme is that it can generate keys of different
security and length by changing the α and β parameters. Figure 3.8(b) shows the
key length and min-entropy versus α with β = 0.1 for abnormal ECG case. As
can be seen in Figure 3.8(b), the length of the keys increase by changing the
α parameter from α=1 to α=0.5. Decreasing α relaxes the constraint on min-
entropy to increase the key size. While lowering the min-entropy may be less
useful in cryptography, it could be helpful in some applications more tolerant to
error such as user identification. Note that reliability (not shown) was relatively
statistics over α. This makes sense since β, which controls reliability, was fixed
for this test.
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3.8: (a) Average reliability and min-entropy for abnormal ECGs verses β,
(b) Impact of α parameter on key length and min-entropy.
3.4.5 Normal ECG Results
3.4.6 Impact of ECG Sample Size on Min-Entropy
As discussed earlier, the min-entropy depends on the probability of each quanti-
zation case. If the samples are not enough, the min-entropy will not be as good as
we expected. To show the impact of sample size on the min-entropy, we consider
the standard deviation and mean of abnormal ECGs signal based on discrete co-
sine transform. Since we want to compare the size of the sample in min-entropy
calculation, we generated random samples from a Gaussian distribution with the
same standard deviation and mean for different sample sizes. As can be seen in
Figure 3.9, the min-entropy result for different β and fixed alpha value 1 grow as
the number of total samples increases from 100 to 100000. At 100000, the min-
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entropy for the one bit case is approximately equal to 1 (ideal) for all values of
β. For the other two cases, the average min-entropy increase with more samples.
We expect them to also converge to 1 given enough qualifying subjects.
(a) (b)
Fig. 3.9: Bar graph for min-entropy (a) 100 sample size, (b) and for 100000
sample size.
3.4.7 Comparison with Prior Quantization Approach
We compared IOMBA with its closest related counterpart DROBA from [57].
Table 3.1 shows that DROBA can generate longer keys compare with IOMBA
approach. However, the reliability is, at best, only 91.79% for normal ECG (first
row), 89.86% for abnormal ECG (second row), and 65.02% for multiple session
ECG (third row). Results of our study for two β parameters for different types of
ECG signal are shown in Table 3.1 as well. Quantization in [57] does not utilize
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a reliability parameter (like β) to manage the margins of the bins and control
the reliability. Hence, additional key bits are chosen that are not reliable enough.
In addition, IOMBA is employing α parameter that can control the min-entropy,
which appear to be larger than DROBA.
Table 3.1: Performance of quantization methods from prior work.
DROBA [57]
Key Reliabiliy Min-entropy
694 91.97 0.61
69 89.86 0.65
810 65.02 0.56
IOMBA
Key Reliability Min-entropy
β=0.01 β=0.05 β=0.01 β=0.05 β=0.01 β=0.05
217 326 99.9 99.6 0.76 0.78
38 50 97.4 96.7 0.78 0.79
100 301 94.7 92.9 0.59 0.61
3.5 Supplementary Material
To evaluate optimized mapping bit allocation (IOMBA) for key generation, we
examined all feature extractions the have been discussed in Section II. We consider
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fixed α parameter. The normal and abnormal ECG signal condition has been
considered. The average, maximum and minimum key length, reliability and
min-entropy for different β parameter are shown in the supplementary material.
Among of all type of feature extraction, the Maximal Overlap Wavelet trans-
form (MODWT) is the best for multiple session ECG signal and the ninth-order
Daubechies (db9) with 9 level decomposition is the best for normal ECG and fi-
nally discrete cosine transform (DCT) is the best for abnormal ECG signal. Since
the PTB database which contains abnormal and normal ECGs are different from
multiple session ECGs in terms of sample rate. We only considered the PTB
database to analyze different feature extraction methods for normal and abnor-
mal ECGs. Then, we investigated seven types of feature extraction techniques to
analyze ECG key generation. Since each feature extraction has different results
in terms of key length, reliability and entropy, we will discuss about the results
as follows:
1. Normalize convolution normalize (NCN): Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11
contain the results for normal and abnormal ECGs. As a result, the min-
entropy, reliability and key length are much lower than Daubechies wavelet
transform for normal ECG. In fact, 92 key lengths with 98.9% reliability can
be achieved based on NCN for normal ECG signal; However, one subject
has been failed in enrollment for β=0.01. On the other side, the abnormal
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3.10: Box plots for normal ECGs of the population based on NCN feature
extraction corresponding to (a) key length, (b) reliability. (c) Shows
bar graph for min-entropy based on 1-bit, 2-bit and 3-bit cases. (d)
Shows the distribution of key bit quantization.
result is pretty good. Besides, the average key length and entropy are slightly
better than DCT method, and one subject has been failed in the enrollment
process here as well. The average key length is 46 and the reliability is
79
98.2%.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3.11: Box plots for abnormal ECGs of the population based on NCN cor-
responding to (a) key length, (b) reliability. (c) shows bar graph for
min-entropy based on 1-bit, 2-bit and 3-bit cases. (d) shows the dis-
tribution of key bit quantization.
2. Haar wavelet transform : Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13 demonstrate the
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results for normal and abnormal ECGs. The average key length at the
minimum error is 72 with 99.93% reliability. This result shows that the
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3.12: Box plots for normal ECGs of the population based on Haar wavelet
transform corresponding to (a) key length, (b) reliability. (c) Shows
bar graph for min-entropy based on 1-bit, 2-bit and 3-bit cases. (d)
Shows the distribution of key bit quantization.
reliability is good but the key length is smaller than Daubechies feature
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extraction. On the other hand, the abnormal result is pretty good. However
the average key length is slightly larger than DCT method which is 45, but
the reliability and entropy are less than DCT feature extraction. As a result,
the 96.8% reliability has been obtained.
3. Discrete cosine transform (DCT): Figure 3.14 shows the results for
normal ECGs. As can be seen in the figure, the average key length is 10 and
the reliability is 99.4%. Compare to the Daubechies transform, even though
the reliability is good, the key length is very low.
4. Daubechies wavelet transform : Figure 3.15 indicates the results for
abnormal ECGs. These results show 24 key length with 85.9% reliability
can be generated based on this method for abnormal ECG signal. This
method is the best feature extraction approache for normal ECG signal
based on empirical results.
5. Coiflet wavelet transform : The results for normal and abnormal ECG
signal are demonstrated in Figure 3.16 and Figure 3.17. 230 key length
with 99.1% reliability can be generated for normal ECG signal based on
coifman wavelet transform. Although the key length is slightly greater than
Daubechies wavelet transform, the entropy rate is less than Daubechies.
Also, the reliability in Daubechies wavelet transform was not worse than
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3.13: Box plots for abnormal ECGs of the population based on Haar wavelet
transform corresponding to (a) key length, (b) reliability. (c) Shows
bar graph for min-entropy based on 1-bit, 2-bit and 3-bit cases. (d)
Shows the distribution of key bit quantization.
96%, as can be seen in Figure 3.16, the worst case reliability is 91%. Be-
sides, the maximum key length based on coifman is less than maximum key
length based on Daubechies wavelet transform. Unlike the normal ECG, the
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3.14: Box plots for normal ECGs of the population based on DCT corre-
sponding to (a) key length, (b) reliability. (c) Shows bar graph for
min-entropy based on 1-bit, 2-bit and 3-bit cases. (d) Shows the dis-
tribution of key bit quantization.
abnormal result is very poor. So that the average key length up to β=0.03
is equal to zero.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3.15: Box plots for abnormal ECGs of the population based on Daubechies
wavelet transform corresponding to (a) key length, (b) reliability. (c)
Shows bar graph for min-entropy based on 1-bit, 2-bit and 3-bit cases.
(d) Shows the distribution of key bit quantization.
6. Biorthogonal wavelet transform : Results for normal and abnormal
ECG signal are indicated in Figures 3.18 and 3.19. Based on our results,
243 key length with 98.4% reliability have been achieved for normal ECG
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3.16: Box plots for normal ECGs of the population based on Coiflet wavelet
transform corresponding to (a) key length, (b) reliability. (c) Shows
bar graph for min-entropy based on 1-bit, 2-bit and 3-bit cases. (d)
Shows the distribution of key bit quantization.
signal and 41 key with 93.5% reliability is the result for abnormal ECG
signal.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3.17: Box plots for abnormal ECGs of the population based on Coiflet
wavelet transform corresponding to (a) key length, (b) reliability. (c)
Shows bar graph for min-entropy based on 1-bit, 2-bit and 3-bit cases.
(d) Shows the distribution of key bit quantization.
7. Maximal overlap wavelet transform (MODWT) : Figure 3.20 and
Figure 3.21 contain the results for normal and abnormal ECGs.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3.18: Box plots for normal ECGs of the population based on Biorthogonal
wavelet transform corresponding to (a) key length, (b) reliability. (c)
Shows bar graph for min-entropy based on 1-bit, 2-bit and 3-bit cases.
(d) Shows the distribution of key bit quantization.
The average key length for normal ECG signal is 509 but the reliability
(96%) is lower than Daubechies. Also in abnormal ECG, the minimum
number of average key is 24, but the reliability (75%) is very lower than
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3.19: Box plots for abnormal ECGs of the population based on Biorthogonal
wavelet transform corresponding to (a) key length, (b) reliability. (c)
Shows bar graph for min-entropy based on 1-bit, 2-bit and 3-bit cases.
(d) Shows the distribution of key bit quantization.
DCT.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3.20: Box plots for normal ECGs of the population based on MODWT
corresponding to (a) key length, (b) reliability. (c) shows bar graph
for min-entropy based on 1-bit, 2-bit and 3-bit cases. (d) shows the
distribution of key bit quantization.
3.6 Conclusion
Biometric-based key generation has to be discriminative and robust enough to
intra-class variations. In this chapter, we introduce interval optimized mapping
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 3.21: Box plots for abnormal ECGs of the population based on MODWT
corresponding to (a) key length, (b) reliability. (c) Shows bar graph
for min-entropy based on 1-bit, 2-bit and 3-bit cases. (d) Shows the
distribution of key bit quantization.
bit allocation (IOMBA) to generate key bits with high reliability and good ran-
domness. We also consider discarding features on a per-individual basis to obtain
longer key lengths. We test IOMBA on different ECG feature selection algorithms
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and on various types of ECG signals and conditions (normal, abnormal, and multi-
session). Our scheme produces relatively long keys for normal ECGs with 99.9%
reliability and allows for tradeoff between reliability and entropy in different ap-
plications. IOMBA also performed well for ECGs taken in multiple sessions. This
is a huge improvement compared to the prior work which extracted 240 bit keys
with 7.9% FRR and 4.6% FAR with ECC and without much flexibility.
Chapter 4
Noise Aware Optimized Mapping Bit Allocation
(NA-IOMBA)
A major challenge in using ECG in biometric applications is that the signal is
often contaminated by noise and artifacts such as power line interface, baseline
drift, motion artifacts, arrhythmias, and electromyography (EMG). Such noise
may lie within the frequency band of interest and can manifest with similar mor-
phology as ECG making it difficult to remove [92]. While approaches based on
fuzzy extraction and error correction code (ECC) [24] have shown promise for gen-
eration of keys from noisy biometric signals, these may not be suitable for ECG.
For example, in body area network (BAN) and implantable medical device (IMD)
applications, the pre-processing, feature extraction, key generation, error correc-
tion, etc. must be performed by very simple devices with little power, storage,
and hardware resources.
In this chapter, we aim to overcome such reliability issues by directly as-
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sessing the impact of all major sources of noise on ECG key generation. We build
upon our recent approach called IOMBA by combining it with a pre-assessment
framework that uses synthetic ECGs to characterize the impact of different sources
of noise on ECG-based keys. Our framework uses an auto-regressive (AR) model
with three modulated sources of noise - baseline wander (BW), electromyography
(EMG), and motion artifact (MA).
Since each of the noise sources have different characteristics in terms of fre-
quency band and amplitude, their impacts on key generation and the cost to mit-
igate them with pre-processing and fuzzy extraction shall be different. Through
a quantitative assessment, it may be possible to optimize ECG key generation on
a user-to-user basis for resource constrained systems. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there has not been any prior research specifically investigating the impact
of noise on ECG key generation. Furthermore, the basis of our approach are syn-
thetic ECGs which enables us to avoid exhaustive measurement of ECGs for the
assessment.
The performance of the proposed framework is validated using normal ECG
signals from popular ECG databases. Different feature extraction methods are
applied for ECG key generation and the performance of each approach with each
noise source is evaluated. The proposed framework can be used to optimize pre-
processing approaches for resource-constrained applications.
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4.1 ECG synthetic model
Since the ECG is constructed from multiple peaks such as P,Q,R, S and T wave
which are like a Gaussian functions with different amplitudes and widths, Mc-
Sharry et al. proposed a non-linear dynamical model for generating realistic syn-
thetic ECG signals using three ordinary differential equations. The model consists
of a circular limit cycle of unit radius in the (x, y) plane around which the trajec-
tory is pushed up and down as it approaches the P,Q,R, S and T points in the
ECG. It is given by the following equations [65]
Fig. 4.1: Typical normal ECG signal. (a) One beat normal ECG signal with
fiducial point, (b) trajectories several cycles of the ECG phase-wrapped
in the Cartesian coordinates.
95
x˙ = αx− ωy
y˙ = αy + ωx
Z˙ = −∑i∈P,Q,R,S,T αi∆θiexp[−∆θ2i2b2i ]− (z − z0)
(4.1)
where α = 1 − √x2 + y2, ∆θi = (θ − θi)mod2pi, θ = tan−1( yx), the angular
position of the elements of x,y, range over [−pi, pi], and ω is the angular velocity of
the trajectory as it moves around the limit cycle. z0 is the contribution from the
baseline that is assumed to be a relatively low frequency signal component coupled
with the respiratory sinus frequency (RSA). Three dimensional (3-D) trajectory
in a 3-D state space with coordinates (x, y, z) and its phase-wrapped trace in the
3-D model space are shown in Figure 4.1(b). We have normalized the amplitude
of a single ECG cycle for simplicity. It can be seen that each component of the
ECG signal is modeled with a Gaussian kernel which has three parameters αi, bi
and θi by neglecting the baseline term (z-z0) in Eq.(6.1). The times and angles are
relative to the position of the R peak since it is always assumed to have zero phase
and the ECG contents lying between two consecutive R peaks are assumed to have
a phase between [−pi, pi] (see Figure 4.1). Thus, the phase signal θ is available by
simply detecting the R peaks. To estimate the dynamic model parameters for the
given ECG, mean and variance of the phase-wrapped ECG is calculated for all
phases between −pi and pi which are depicted in Figure 4.1.
The dynamic state equations proposed by McSharry et al. can also be
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transformed into polar coordinates as follows [86]
r˙ = r(1− r)
θ˙ = ω
Z˙ = −∑i∈P,Q,R,S,T αi∆θiexp[−∆θ2i2b2i ]− (z − z0)
(4.2)
The first equation in (Eq. (6.2)) shows the circular behavior of the generated
trajectory by the model. Second and third equations in (Eq. (6.2)) are independent
from r, making the first equation redundant. Therefore the first equation may be
excluded as it has no effect on the synthetic ECG.
4.2 ECG Noise Modeling
Raw ECG signals contain both high and low frequency noise components which
are often non-stationary in time. Baseline wander (BW) is an extraneous and
low frequency activity in the ECG signal. EMG noise is caused by the electrical
activity of skeletal muscles during periods of contraction. Motion artifacts (MA)
are transient baseline changes caused by changes in the electrode skin impedance
with electrode motion. Time-varying auto-regressive (AR) parametric models
can be applied to generate realistic ECG noise which follow the non-stationary
characteristics and the spectral shape of real noise. Thus, it is possible to generate
noise with different variances through a time-varying AR model. The parameters
of this model are trained by using real noises such as NSTDB [67]. To estimate
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the time-varying AR parameters, a standard Kalman Filter (KF) is used [85]. For
the time series of yn, a time-varying AR model of order p can be written as follows:
yn = −
p∑
i
an(i)y(n− i) + vn (4.3)
where vn is the input white noise and an(i)(i = 1, ..., p) coefficients are the
p time-varying AR parameters at the time instance of n. By defining xn =
[an(1), an(2), ..., an(p)]
T as a state vector, and hn = [yn−1, yn−2, ..., yn−p]T as obser-
vation model, we can reformulate the problem of AR parameter estimation in the
KF form. We refer the reader to [85] for more details. Having the time-varying
AR model, we later generate synthetic BW, EM, and MA noise with different
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Since the sampling rate of original source noises and
ECG signals are 360 and 1000 Hz, the synthetic noises are re-sampled to 1000 Hz.
Fig. 4.2 (a) presents the experimental protocol of NA-IOMBA scheme for
noisy ECG signals. In noisy ECG key margin reconstruction, dynamic model
parameters (θi, αi, bi) from original ECG signal are considered as the input of the
synthetic ECG module. Then, synthetic ECG noise model with desired SNR is
employed to add into the clean (synthetic) ECG. In order to assess a noise model in
NA-IOMBA, we assume Ne and Nv are the noise in the enrollment and verification
measurement, respectively. The synthetic noise model is employed as verification
noise. It is assumed that Ne and Nv are mutually independent where the standard
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deviation of measurement noise are denoted as σe and σv respectively. We will
adopt synthetic ECG noise as our noise model where we assume that σv > σe.
Thus, re-optimization of IOMBA margins module in NA-IOMBA determines new
margins based on feedback from this assessment. For our approach, we consider
the mixed noises with SNR=5dB for ECG margin reconstruction.
(a) (b)
Fig. 4.2: Block diagrams show for NA-IOMBA margin reconstruction key calcu-
lation from; (a) noisy ECG, (b) stressed ECG.
4.3 Pre-processing
4.3.1 Filtering & R peak det.
The filtering and R peak detection are similar to the chapter 3.
4.3.2 Feature Extraction Approaches
(1) Morphology of ECG: Since each heartbeat contains a series of important
components such as P,Q,R, S and T peaks (Fig. 4.1), one can consider the win-
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dow over the R peak in each beat to reach the segmented ECG. Note that the
segmented ECG signal (entire heartbeat) is called morphology of the ECG signal.
The choice of using the entire heartbeat morphology have been used with the
intention of keeping the computational complexity low, using only R peak detec-
tion. Another advantage of using entire heartbeat morphology is it can avoid the
detection of the fiducial points related with other waveform components (e.g., P
wave and T wave), which are usually more sensitive to noise due to their relatively
lower magnitudes.
(2) Normalized Autocorrelation (AC): The ECG signal is a non-stationary
signal and consists of repetitive waveform patterns. The motivation behind this
non-fiducial approach is the use of normalized autocorrelation (AC) method on
non-overlapping windows of the filtered individual ECG signal without the use of
fiducial point (landmark) detection [76]. In order to extract the feature vector
representing the ECG’s signature, a windowed ECG signal and estimation of the
normalized AC over a window of m are taken into account. In fact, autocor-
relation gives an automatic shift invariant feature set that represents repetitive
characteristics over multiple heartbeat cycles. The autocorrelation coefficients can
be written as:
R[m] =
1
R[0]
∑
i
s[i]s[i+m] (4.4)
where s[i] is the ECG signal at time i and m is chosen greater than the mean
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QRS duration.
(3) Normalize-Convoluted Normalize (NCN): Normalize-Convoluted Nor-
malize (NCN) is used in [88]. The approach focuses on the QRS complex which
is more invariant than other peaks over time. It begins by detecting the R peak.
Then an equal number of sample points from both sides of the identified R wave
are selected.
4.3.3 Simulation Experiments
Feature Selection : To evaluate our approaches for key generation, we consider
all the feature selection methods previously discussed.
Quantization : After feature selection, IOMBA was applied to encode the real
values into binary. We applied dynamic quantization with maximum number of
bits per feature as three for simplicity.
Reliability : Reliability of ECG key generation represents the stability of key over
different noise sources. If the all bits generated by the synthetic ECG signal of an
individual are equal to the associated key (key has been produced in enrollment),
it can be considered as reliable. Thus, intra-hamming distance (HD) is used to
compute key reliability:
Reliability = 100− 1
N
N∑
i=1
(KRef ⊕KSyn)× 100% (4.5)
where KRef is the reference key (average several segments of a sample) and KRef
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is the key derived from the synthetic noisy ECG. Note that, N is the number of
key bits.
Impact of ECG Noise Source on Key Reliability :
Figure 4.3 is a box plot showing the reliability rate versus input signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) for ECG based on IOMBA without denoising filters, IOMBA
with denoising filters, and NA-IOMBA. The SNR during the noisy segments was
set to 30dB, 20dB, 10dB, 5dB, 0dB, and -5dB separately. Figures 4.3 (a-d) indi-
cate the impact of each noise source (BW, EM, and MA, and mixed of them) on
the reliability. In the context of ECG noise levels, the lower SNR provides more
fluctuation on ECGs (higher intra-class variation). Intuitively, there appears to
be an inverse relationship between the level of generated noise and reliability.
Among all these noise sources, MA and EM are the strongest noise sources and
have enormous impact on key reliability when IOMBA is applied with and without
filtering. As one would expect, IOMBA with filtering obtains better key reliability
than without. However, for NA-IOMBA, the reliability is never less than 96.7%
even at worst case (mixed noise with -5dB). In contrast, there is considerable
degradation beyond 20dB by using IOMBA with/without filtering (63% relia-
bility). As mentioned earlier, ECC increases nonlinearly with number of errors.
NA-IOMBA has a very high reliability compared to IOMBA, and therefore ECC
will inherently consume less overhead. The cost reduction is discussed further
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below.
(c) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 4.3: IOMBA, filtered IOMBA, and NA-IOMBA Keys reliability rate vs in-
put SNR; impact of (a) BW noise, (b) EM noise, (c) MA noise, and
(d) mixed noises, on the reliability.
Note that since the features with less reliability in IOMBA are discarded
in NA−IOMBA, the key length is decreased. This is an unavoidable tradeoff for
this technique. Still, the key lengths are quite long especially for the morphology
feature extraction approach. Since the pre-processing has not been considered in
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NA− IOMBA, the cost of reconstruction is much lower as a results which helps
for saving energy consumption specific in IoT era.
Finally, we conduct several case studies. In the first, the proposed noise-
aware approach is compared to our previous approach for multiple biometric
modalities, including popular ones (fingerprint and iris) and emerging cardiovas-
cular ones (ECG and PPG). The results show that ECG provides the best tradeoff
between reliability, key length, entropy, and cost. In the second and third case
studies, we demonstrate how reliability, denoising costs, and enrollment times can
be simultaneously improved by modeling subject intra-variations for ECG.
The following are the impacts and benefits of this approach:
• Impact on key length: If a margin for a feature increases, it could result in
the feature being selected and/or longer bit lengths compared to IOMBA.
If a margin for a feature shrinks, it could result in the feature no longer
being selected and/or shorter bit lengths compared to IOMBA.
• Impact on key reliability: If provided noise samples or models are accu-
rate, the reliability of key should improve regardless of whether or not the
key length shrinks/grows.
• Impact on cost and enrollment time: There are three ways that over-
heads can be reduced. First, error correction costs tend to increase nonlin-
104
early. By improving key reliability, error correction hardware can be sub-
stantially reduced. Second, certain denoising/filtering steps can be removed
provided that NA-IOMBA models accurately estimate the noise appearing
in features without them. Third, number of enrollment samples and enroll-
ment time can be reduced if noise over time and different conditions can be
modeled. This can be particularly important for continuous physiological
signals, like ECG and PPG, which can be impacted by so many different
conditions, e.g., exercise, stress, and food/drink/drug consumption.
4.4 NA-IOMBA Case Studies
The above impacts will be demonstrated in the next section.
4.4.1 Case Study I: Comparison of Multiple Modalities Using
IOMBA and NA-IOMBA
In this section, we present a comprehensive performance evaluation of biometric-
based key generation. We apply our approaches (IOMBA & NA-IOMBA) on
four biometric modalities: ECG, PPG, iris, and fingerprint. Table 4.1 shows
the methodologies, databases, and train/test sizes, that have been employed for
multiple biometric modalities.
Electrocardiogram (ECG): ECG is a recording of the electric potential, gen-
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Table 4.1: High-level summary analysis for multiple biometric modalities
Databases Population size Train / Test sizes Pre-processing Feature Extraction
ECG PTB 52 52*1000/1560*1000 FIR filter, R peak det., Segmentation NCN
PPG Capnobase 42 42*700/ 840*700 Butterworth, Peak det., Segmentation DWT
Iris CASIAV1 108 108*4800/756*4800 Localization Gabor wavelet
Finger FVC2004-DB3 100 100*6056/800*6056 Normalization, Orientation Gabor wavelet
erated by the electric activity of the heart. The ECG recordings of 52 subjects
from the PTB database [36] are used in this chapter. We employ low and high
pass finite impulse response (FIR) filters with cut off frequencies 1Hz-40Hz to
eliminate noise associated with an ECG signal. Normalize-Convoluted Normalize
(NCN) is used as the feature extraction technique [49].
Photoplethysmogram (PPG): The photoplethysmogram (PPG) is a biomed-
ical signal that estimates volumetric blood flow changes in peripheral circulation
using low-cost and simple LED-based devices typically placed on the fingertips.
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the PPG biometric authentication based on
IOMBA and NA-IOMBA, a publicly available Capnobase dataset [50] with 42
subjects was used.
Iris: The iris is the annular region of the eye bounded by the pupil and the sclera
(white of the eye) on either side. To evaluate the iris key generation based on
IOMBA and NA-IOMBA, we first take the iris images from available CASIAv1-
Interval iris database [8]. For pre-processing and feature extraction, we have
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employed iris code [21].
Fingerprint: A fingerprint is the pattern of ridges and valleys on the surface of
a fingertip, the formation of which is determined during the first seven months of
fetal development. The fingerprint used for biometric key generation for system
authentication in the study is taken from FVC2004 database [59]. In this chap-
ter, Gabor filter is used to directly extract fingerprint features from gray level
images [82].
The quality of generated keys are compared by four evaluation criteria: relia-
bility, entropy, key length, and cost. The metrics used for each are discussed below
and a brief comparison of the above biometric modalities based on IOMBA and
NA-IOMBA is provided in Tables 4.2 under reliability, entropy, and key length.
In the table, ‘max’, ‘ave’, and ‘min’ columns correspond to the highest value (best
case) achieved among all users, the average of keys across the users, and the lowest
value (worst case) achieved among all users. Note that for this initial comparison,
the noise model in NA-IOMBA is adopted from standard deviation of enrollment
measurements and standard deviation is adjusted on a per feature basis. A more
elaborate model will be used for ECGs only later in the chapter.
Reliability: Reliability of key generation represents the stability of keys over
time. If all bits generated by the biometric of an individual are equal to the
key produced in enrollment, it can be considered as reliable. As can be seen in
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Table 4.2: IOMBA/NA-IOMBA Results for Four Biometric Modalities
Key Length (N) Reliability Min-entropy
Max Ave Min Max Ave Min Max Ave Min
ECG
NA-IOMBA 1247 953 784 100 98.76 96.17 1.000 0.9843 0.9055
IOMBA 976 668 512 100 97.93 94.71 1.000 0.9819 0.8904
PPG
NA-IOMBA 195 107 17 100 99.04 91.11 0.9943 0.8630 0.6229
IOMBA 175 114 14 100 96.63 89.00 0.9787 0.8047 0.5732
Iris
NA-IOMBA 1136 556 128 100 98.36 93.42 1.000 0.9376 0.7870
IOMBA 204 66 23 100 96.81 86.73 1.000 0.869 0.7564
Finger
NA-IOMBA 3567 1004 321 99.54 98.76 91.72 1.000 0.8219 0.4913
IOMBA 1164 835 187 99.20 95.12 72.29 0.9939 0.7574 0.3258
Table 4.2, improvements in reliability are achieved by applying the NA-IOMBA
technique. Average and worst cases improve by 2% and 9.7% on average for all
modalities compared to IOMBA. Among all modalities, fingerprint attains the
largest percentage improvements (3.8% and 26.9% in average and worst cases).
However, ECG has the best performance for both NA-IOMBA and IOMBA.
Entropy: As shown in Tables 4.2, the min-entropy of ECG signal is higher than
iris, PPG and fingerprint However, under NA-IOMBA technique, there is a huge
entropy improvement for iris, fingerprint and PPG compare with IOMBA results.
For example, the min-entropy is not only improved by 35% at minimum case for
fingerprint based on NA-IOMBA, but also increased by 8% at average case.
Key length: Since certain features may be reliable for some users and unreliable
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for others, our approach will only use reliable features from each individual. Thus,
the key length per person may change. As can be indicated in Table 4.2, the key
length of ECG, PPG, iris, and fingerprint based on IOMBA are 668, 114, 66,
and 835, respectively. When NA-IOMBA is applied, the average key length for
ECG, PPG, iris, and fingerprint increases by 30%, 6%, 88%, and 27%. Fingerprint
obtains the largest key for both IOMBA and NA-IOMBA while PPG obtains the
smallest.
Cost: The effectiveness of a biometric technology is dependent on how and where
it is used. Each biometric modality has its own strengths and weaknesses. Today,
an ECG or a PPG sensor costs around $20 when ordered in large quantities, thus
has marginal cost of embedding into a biometric system. However, fingerprint
and iris scan costs about $70 and $280, respectively. Note that the hardware cost
is normalized into 1 in order to make it simpler to consider as a metrics. In that
case, if the value is lower than 1; meaning a more expensive sensor.
Figure 4.4 (a) ranks four common technologies (ECG, PPG, iris scan, finger
scan) according to four criteria: reliability, entropy, key length, and hardware cost.
The maximum point in each length indicates the best candidate for that specific
criteria. As can be seen in Figure 4.4, the average reliability of ECG is 99.76%
belong to the maximum point of plot while the average reliability of iris is 98.36%
which belongs to the minimum point of plot. In addition, the entropy of ECG is
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on the maximum point of plot. For the cost, PPG is the best choice among all
biometric modalities. Furthermore, the key length of fingerprint is higher than
other biometric modalities which made it to become at top of the plot, although
the ECG signal is following this with a small margin. ECG appears to be the best
candidate for all the criteria when applying NA-IOMBA. However, it is worth
noting that ECG still suffers from several other issues (impact of noises, stress
condition, and aging) that need to be tackled in order to make this candidate an
even stronger selection. NA-IOMBA will be used to alleviate these concerns in
the next subsections.
(a) (b)
Fig. 4.4: (a) Star graph for comprehensive comparison among four biometrics
using NA-IOMBA. (b) One beat ECG with fiducial point.
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4.4.2 Case Study: Reducing Enrollment Times
Another concern that restricts the use of ECG for biometric authentication is
the variability of cardiac rhythm within the subjects. Heart rate varies with
individual’s physiological and mental conditions. Stress, excitement, exercise,
and other working activities may have impact on the heart rate and can elevate
it. These variations are likely to affect the reliability of ECG based key generation.
A previous study [52] about the influences of physical exercises indicates that the
ECG morphology is affected by exercise/stress. In other words, each peak (P,
QRS, T) in the ECG may increase/decrease in amplitude, temporal location, etc.
To cover the impact of stress/exercise on the reliability with different scenario, we
vary the dynamical model parameters by type (θi, αi, bi∀i) and analyze the impact
of each part of ECG waveform. In Fig. 4.2 (b), we illustrate how noise in ECG
features from stress/exercise can be handled using the model in NA-IOMBA. In
order to assess the impact of stress in NA-IOMBA, NA-IOMBA trains itself with
the help of the information from standard deviation of stress ECG signal model
and re-optimizes IOMBA margins.
Each dynamical model parameter is scaled by a factor (0.9−0.5). Fig. 4.5(a-
c) show how the ECG changes when scaling α, b, and θ parameters respectively.
As shown in Fig. 4.5 (a), the α parameter controls amplitudes of each component
of ECG waveform. In contrast, the onset and offset of ECG waveform and interval
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duration are associated with scaling b and θ parameters. We intend to investigate
the impact of dynamic parameters on each ECG waveform component to ana-
lyze the impact of stress and exercise on the reliability of IOMBA/NA-IOMBA.
Fig. 4.6((a-c) indicate the reliability of each dynamic parameters on the P, QRS,
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 4.5: Impact of ECG signal by decreasing dynamical model parameters: (a)
α parameters associated with amplitude, (b) b parameters, and (c) θ
parameters associated with interval and heart rate.
and T waves based on IOMBA, respectively. The reliability of NA-IOMBA is
shown in Fig. 4.6(d-f) where IOMBA margins are re-optimized assuming dynamic
parameters scaled to 0.7. For IOMBA, the T wave is impacted by all parameters
(α, b, and θ). At lowest scale value (0.5), the minimum reliability of dynamic pa-
rameters of T wave is 71.61% while for P and QRS wave are 72.37%, and 73.96%
respectively. θ has a larger impact than other parameters for P and QRS waves
because it causes distortion in ECG time intervals (distances between peaks).
Even though there is too much degradation on the reliability for IOMBA tech-
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nique, the performance of NA-IOMBA in stress/exercise situation is much higher
than IOMBA. The minimum reliability of dynamic parameter on P, QRS, and T
waves (Fig. 4.6(d)) are improved by 25%. Note, however, that the key length is
sacrificed by 56% (420 average key bits) to obtain this improvement. We expect
that this will be long enough for most cryptographic applications.
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Fig. 4.6: Impact of stress/exercise on the reliability of; IOMBA for changing (a)
P wave, (b) QRS wave, (c) T wave; NA-IOMBA for changing, (d) P
wave, (e) QRS wave, and (f) T wave of ECG.
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4.5 Denoising Overhead Reduction
In order to determine the sensitivity of ECG key generation based on these feature
extraction, the noisy ECG signal with different variances (SNR) has been applied.
To view the impact of each noise source, synthetic ECGs are generated and not
pre-processed to remove the noise.
Table 4.3: Hardware utilization report on the Zynq-7000 SoC XC7Z020.
Resource IOMBA Usage NA-IOMBA Usage Available
Flip Flops 11830 1064 106400
Look-Up Tables 10386 2232 53200
DSP Slices 157 21 220
I/O 32 20 200
4.5.1 FPGA Implementation of an IOMBA
In this chapter, finite impulse response (FIR) is designed using Simulink in Xil-
inx System Generator. The Xilinx System Generator tool is a high-level tool
for designing high-performance DSP systems and enables us to integrate Xilinx
with Simulink. To implement noise reduction using FIR filter, a FDA tool has
been applied to design a filter for required specifications. Pan Tompkins algo-
rithm is applied for detecting ECG R peak and segmentation. Finally, the NCN
feature extraction technique has been considered for key generation. Table 4.3
shows implementation of the ECG key generation using IOMBA with filtering
114
and NA-IOMBA without filtering on the Xilinx Zynq-7000. In IOMBA case, 11%
of total flip-flops (FF), 20% of all available Look-up tables (LUTs), and 71% of
the DSP slice are used while in NA-IOMBA consumes only 1% of FFs, 4% of
LUTs, and 10% of DSP are utilized. In addition, IOMBA consumes 113 mW
power while NA-IOMBA consumes only 39 mW power. As a result, by saving
overall overhead while applying NA-IOMBA, we are able to add ECC in the IoT
devices to reconstruct the errors. In fact, NA-IOMBA allows hardware to adapt
pre-processing, feature extraction, post-processing, and error correction overheads
on a user-to-user basis.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the effect of noise sources on key generation from a
synthetic ECG signal and how much effort is needed to remove noise on a per
user basis. For resource-constrained applications (such as IoT and remote health
monitoring), significant resources could be saved as a result. We propose NA −
IOMBA to improve the reliability of key. In addition, three feature extraction
methods are applied in order to analyze their sensitivity to noise and measure
the key length resulting from IOMBA. Having knowledge of this information,
we may be able to design our hardware more efficiently in resource constrained
systems. In future work, we plan on building an ECG-biometric system and
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applying NA − IOMBA on ECGs collected in our lab to validate the proposed
approaches and to estimate the cost reduction. It was demonstrated that keys
generated from ECG, PPG, iris, and fingerprint by noise-aware IOMBA were
more reliable, longer, and higher entropy than noise-free IOMBA. In addition, by
using more advanced noise models for ECG, overhead from denoising filters and
error correction could be further reduced by 62% without additional enrollment
measurements.
Chapter 5
Secure and Reliable Biometric Access Control for
Resource-Constrained Systems
Biometric-based authentication is promising for IoT due to its convenient nature
and lower susceptibility to attacks. However, the costs associated with biometric
processing and template protection are nontrivial for smart cards, key fobs, and
so forth. In addition, there is a notable need for low-cost biometric access control
schemes that allow peoples to access IoT device. Traditional implementations of
biometric systems continue vulnerable to a variety of physical attacks impacting
template theft/privacy, unauthorized access, etc. However, secure and reliable
biometric access control for resource-constrained systems remains a challenge.
Existing countermeasures for protecting the template are limited. In the
most common instantiation (match-on server), the template exists on a central-
ized server in a raw, encrypted, salted, or transformed form. The template or
keys/parameters protecting them are vulnerable to hackers who time and again
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break through security (e.g., Equifax data breach [26] , OPM theft of 5.1 million
fingerprints [75] , etc.). More often than not, communication between devices
and servers in IoT applications is insecure (e.g., passwords transmitted in plain-
text [18]) due to time-to-market constraints or inexperience in security imple-
mentations. In an alternative instantiation (match-on card/device), the biometric
information never leaves the card/device. However, the aforementioned physi-
cal attacks can be used to gleam the template from the card/device or bypass
critical security modules. Recently, homomorphic encryption has been proposed
for securing biometric templates because it performs matching in the encrypted
domain [15], [44]. However, such approaches are still far from efficient, requiring
several orders of magnitude extra hardware and operational time [7]. Further,
they still may be susceptible to attacks on the secret key kept on the user-side
and fault injection at the decision module.
In this chapter, we introduce a new framework called BLOcKeR for imple-
menting biometric systems based on physical unclonable functions (PUFs) and
hardware obfuscation that, unlike traditional software approaches, does not re-
quire non-volatile storage of a biometric template/key.
Our proposed new paradigm called “Biometric Locking by Obfuscation,
Physically Unclonable Keys, and Reconfigurability” (BLOcKeR) which aims to
providie low-cost template protection and attack resistance in match-on card/device
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applications. A central element of BLOcKeR is hardware personalization through
reconfigurability. In short, the cost associated with biometric systems is improved
by adapting the preprocessing, feature extraction, and postprocessing modules on
a user-to-user basis. In addition, we combine two advances in hardware security -
obfuscation [29] and physical unclonable functions (PUFs) [34], [94] with config-
urability to significantly increase resistance to various attacks against biometric
systems.
Aside from reducing the risk of compromising the biometric, the nature of
obfuscation also provides protection against access control circumvention via mal-
ware and fault injection. The PUF provides non-invertibility and non-linkability.
Second, a major requirement of the proposed PUF/obfuscation approach is that
a reliable (robust) key be generated from the user’s input biometric.
5.1 Hardware Security Preliminaries and BLOcKeR
Before introducing BLOcKeR, the background knowledge and fundamental con-
cepts of reconfigurability, hardware obfuscation, and PUF are introduced.
Reconfigurability in hardware refers to the ability to customize logic gates
of an integrated circuit (IC) and their connections in the field. For FPGAs, this
customization is referred to as a bitstream, and it is typically stored in a non-
volatile memory. In BLOcKeR, we utilize the bitstream obfuscation scheme which
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was first introduced in [46]. Hardware obfuscation is described in introduction
chapter.
This key-based bitstream obfuscation technique applies to reconfigurable
fabrics and can be used with off-the-shelf field programmable gate array (FPGA)
hardware. It leverages unused FPGA resources within an existing design as shown
in Fig. 5.1, thereby incurring very little overhead. In this figure, the original
design consists of 4 configurable logic blocks (CLBs) which can support three input
functions. However, only two input functions are used by the original application,
thus leaving half of the LUT unoccupied. After obfuscation, these unused bits
are filled with other functions; the correct response selection depends on the key
input position and value. The obfuscated bitstream can take one of two formats:
(a) structural Verilog, which implements the circuit as a series of assignment
statements, or (b) using device-specific LUT primitive functions. Compared to
the previously described obfuscation approaches, we choose bitstream obfuscation
because it allows the obfuscation key to change for every chip/user due to the
reconfigurable hardware. This is an important feature since a biometric-derived
key will be different from user to user. Other obfuscation approaches are fixed by
a master key and cannot be adapted in this manner.
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Fig. 5.1: Robust bitstream protection in FPGA-based systems through low-
overhead obfuscation.
5.1.1 Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs)
The best way to describe a PUF is that it is “an object’s fingerprint”. Like a bio-
metric which expresses a human’s identity, a PUF is an expression of an inherent
and unclonable instance-specific feature of a physical object [58]. For integrated
circuits (ICs), these instance-specific features are induced by manufacturing pro-
cess variations and can be captured by the input/output or challenge/response
pairs (CRPs) of the PUF. The challenge/response relationship can be viewed as
a physical one-way function which provides the design with a non-invertible ca-
pability. In addition, due to IC-to-IC process variations, the CRPs are unique to
each device. We refer to this property as non-linkability.
A variety of PUFs have been proposed in the literature [58]. They can be
broadly classified into electronic and non-electronic categories. In the former, the
challenge-response mechanism is determined based on the electronic properties
121
of an object such as delay of internal circuit paths, the threshold voltages of
transistors, etc. Examples of this PUF type include arbiter PUF, ring oscillator
PUF, SRAM PUF, etc. The non-electronic PUF generates the CRPs based on the
non-electronic properties of an object, such as magnetic, acoustic, radio frequency,
etc.
According to the number of total CRPs available, PUFs can be classified
as strong and weak. A PUF is called strong if, even after giving an adversary
access to a PUF instance for a prolonged period, it is still possible to come up
with an unknown CRP with high probability. This implies that the considered
PUF should have an exponentially sized CRP set. Otherwise, the adversary can
simply query all challenges. PUFs which do not meet these requirements are
consequentially called weak PUFs. In BLOcKeR, a strong PUF is utilized.
A recently developed attack against the strong PUF applies well-developed
machine learning algorithms (such as logistic regression) to model challenge-
response behaviors [84] based on a subset of CRPs. This CRP set is collected
from the strong PUF via the direct physical access. With this model, a new CRP
can be predicted without having physical access to the device. A high prediction
rate (i.e., 99.9%) can be achieved with short training time (i.e., 2.1 seconds) [84].
Note that, in BLOcKeR, this modeling attack is seen as a benefit. More details
will be given in Section 5.1.2.
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5.1.2 BLOcKeR Flow
In this section, the BLOcKeR enrollment and authentication processes are dis-
cussed (see Fig. 5.2). The enrollment process involves three major steps: hard-
ware enrollment, ownership claim, and firmware customization. The first step to
Fig. 5.2: Overall implementation flow of BLOcKeR.
initialize BLOcKeR, hardware enrollment, is accomplished before the device
is sent to the market and occurs in a trusted environment. During this step, the
designer or system vendor builds a strong PUF model for each device using a ded-
icated firmware and stores the models in a secure database. This firmware enables
the designer to efficiently collect a sufficient number of CRPs for the prediction
model. After enrolling the PUF model, this firmware will be removed. At this
point, the device encloses no firmware and will be sold to the user through the in-
secure supply chain. Since neither the user nor attacker could have the high-speed
and direct access to the PUF challenges after this point, the prediction model is
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therefore accessible only to the designer.
To register and operate the device, the ownership claim step is taken by
the legitimate user1. The users ownership is taken by presenting his/her biomet-
ric signal to the device. A pre-processing algorithm is applied on the received
biometric to extract the binary bio key. Along with this process, necessary helper
data (i.e., error correction code or ECC [48]) might be generated for correcting
errors during later authentication steps. A PUF is used as a one-way transform
on the quantized biometric. In order to generate the PUF challenge, the bio key
is processed by a hardware hash function to the desired length. The output is
transmitted to the designer through a secure channel. This can be achieved by
either a trusted retailer (e.g., Verizon) or a trusted platform module (TPM) en-
abled device (e.g., laptops). Note that in BLOcKeR, the biometric template is
never stored on the device and never sent to the designer/vendor.
When the PUF challenge is received by the designer, the firmware cus-
tomization step occurs. This is where the previous strong PUF model is ben-
eficial. The challenge is fed into the strong PUF model to compute a unique
device and biometric dependent response, which will behave as an obfuscation
key (obs key). An obfuscated bitstream is produced that will exploit this obfusca-
tion key. The obfuscated bitstream is sent to the user and loaded into the device.
1 Note that this step only occurs once
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Note that since the physical device with the PUF is no longer accessible to the
designer/vendor, this step would not be possible without the previously generated
strong PUF model.
During the authentication process, the user provides his/her biometric as
input. The same pre-processing algorithm as the enrollment process is applied to
generate the bio key. Potential errors are corrected with the helper data. Next, the
hash function creates the challenge. The obs key is then generated by injecting
this challenge into the strong PUF. Different from the enrollment process, this
obfuscation key is generated on the physical device instead of its mathematic
model. A correct obs key unlocks the obfuscated bitstream and brings the device
into functional (unlocked) mode. Without the correct key, the device will simply
not work correctly. For example, it will be unable to access data, perform critical
protocols, etc. Note that the biometric template, bio key, and obs key are never
stored in non-volatile (permanent) memory on the card/device or server.
Its important to note that since the obfuscation key is generated from the
PUF circuit, it may be subjected to various environmental noise such as temper-
ature instability, supply voltage fluctuation, etc. For instance, the arbiter PUF
exploits a race condition between two paths of the same length. Process varia-
tions of the transistors on these paths determine the competition result. However,
an increased temperature could cause a faster path to become slower. In some
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instances, the temperature effect overrides the process variation and generates er-
rors. Thus, the PUF response may vary slightly even for the same challenge due to
noise. To address these errors, an additional ECC module can be implemented for
the PUF. Alternatively, the obfuscated bitstream can be constructed to tolerate
these errors. The latter is a promising topic for future work.
Beside from the need for configurable hardware, BLOcKeR also needs; A
binary key from biometric data to unlock the to unlock an obfuscated system;
A hash function in order to fixed the size of binary key; A strong PUF is re-
quired because the CRP needed is a variable determined by the user’s biometrics.
Generating reliable binary key from biometric is described in chapter 3 and 4.
5.1.3 Salient Features of BLOcKeR
The following are noteworthy features of the BLOcKeR framework:
• By incorporating a PUF, the scheme possesses a non-invertible property
that makes it similar to feature transformation approaches in the litera-
ture [41]. This implies that an attacker cannot reconstruct the biometric
template even if the obfuscation key is ever stolen from the server or work-
ing card/device.
• Another major advantage of the PUF is its non-linkable property, which
means that a user’s biometric can be only used to unlock one device. In
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other words, the obfuscated bitstream produced for every device is unique
to both the device and the legitimate user. Therefore, even a legitimately
enrolled user of one device cannot unlock the device which it is not bonded
with.
• The enrollment/authentication processes inherently provide information
security. All private information is kept secret and never stored in a non-
volatile (permanent) memory. Only the strong PUF challenge is transmitted
to the server, and the biometric template is protected by non-invertibility
of the hash function and PUF. The obfuscation key is generated when the
user authenticates and is also never permanently stored. These features
dramatically reduce the attack surface at the chip/device, server, and com-
munication channel.
• Reconfigurability is advantageous because it allows each devices obfus-
cation/locking to be tuned to its owner. In addition, it allows the hardware
to adapt pre-processing, feature extraction, post-processing, and error cor-
rection overheads on a user-to-user basis. This latter benefit will be made
clearer in the remaining sections of the chapter.
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5.1.4 Attacks Analysis
The unique structure of BLOcKeR protects it from the majority of the attacks
mentioned in chapter introduction.
Different from the traditional biometric system, BLOcKeR never stores the
templates anywhere. Thus, all the attacks which target a stored template (whether
in raw, encrypted, or salted form) are eliminated.
For eliminating type 2 attacks (figure 5.3), where a previously intercepted
biometric is replayed, a PUF challenge is presented to the sensor by a secure trans-
action server. At that time, the sensor acquires the current biometric signal and
computes the response corresponding to the challenge. The acquired signal and
the corresponding response are sent to the transaction server where the response
is checked against the received signal for consistency.
A potential abuse of biometric identifiers is cross-matching or theft template
where the biometric identifiers are used for purposes other than the intended
purpose. As an example, a biometric template stolen from a bank’s database may
be used to search a criminal fingerprint database or cross-link to a person’s health
records. Since the template is never stored anywhere in BLOcKeR, the template
privacy issues are eliminated.
An adversary can either sabotage or intrude on the communication inter-
faces between different modules (type 7). For instance, he can place an interfering
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source near the communication channel (e.g., a jammer to obstruct a wireless
interface). If the channel is not secured physically or cryptographically, an adver-
sary may also intercept and/or modify the data being transferred. A common way
to secure a channel is by cryptographically encoding all the data sent through the
interface. Cryptography is not only costly for IoT devices but also side-channel at-
tacks may be employed. Due to the absence of the matcher module in BLOcKeR,
type 7 attacks are prevented (figure 5.3).
Fig. 5.3: Biometric System and the nine different points of attack.
For the attacks on modules, no matcher or decision module is implemented
in BLOcKeR. Instead of comparing the biometric with a template, an obfuscation
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key resolves a device-unique obfuscation. Thus, no semi-invasive nor non-invasive
attacks which target this component are applicable. In this case, type 8 attacks
are prevented. In addition, the bitstream of the application device is locked in-
stead of any software-level authentication. Thus, any software based attacks, such
as Trojan, malware, and buffer overflow are inapplicable. Besides final decision
overriding (type 9 attack), the attacker may still attempt to apply the hill climb-
ing attack by injecting the synthesized feature vector (figure 5.3). This attack
improves the key in a bit-wise manner by observing the behavior of the system.
All the key bits should be examined before the termination of the attack.
Attacks such as type 1 attack (presentation attack) cannot be prevented
by BLOcKeR (figure 5.3). Since BLOcKeR acquires the raw biometric trait di-
rectly from the sensor, the attacker can inject fake biometric. To overcome such
presentation attacks against the biometric, liveness detection methods such as
temperature is required. At minimum, the ECG would be useful in providing
liveness detection. In addition, type 3 attack (override features) cannot be pre-
vented by BLOcKeR. Since the attacker can force the feature extractor to produce
the wrong feature set.
Since the bitstream obfuscation is engaged in BLOcKeR, obfuscation-oriented
attacks must also be accounted for since they may introduce new vulnerabilities.
The most straightforward attack is brute-force. An adversary either randomly
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applies: (i) synthesized biometric signals (at arrow 0 in Fig. 5.2) or (ii) the ob-
fuscation key (at arrow 4 in Fig. 5.2) until the correct system functionality is
observed. This attack is (types 8 and 9) infeasible in both cases due to the ex-
tremely large analog input and binary obfuscation key spaces. Furthermore, brute
force cannot be improved through hill climbing since (i) there is no matching mod-
ule to provide a score and (ii) a non-invertible transform is applied to the input.
Specifically, the data flow back from arrow 4 to 3 (Fig. 5.2) is blocked by the
strong PUF. The data flow back from arrow 3 to 2 (Fig. 5.2) is blocked by the
one-way hash function.
Besides brute force, a more advanced attack on obfuscation is based on sat-
isfiability checking (SAT) [93]. The SAT attack infers the correct key using a
small number of carefully selected input patterns and their correct outputs ob-
served from an activated functional device. Since the obfuscation key is destroyed
after losing power (i.e., it’s not stored in non-volatile memory), it is unlikely for
an adversary to capture an activated device. Even if the adversary is a legitimate
user and has access to an activated device, the strong PUF module is still a black
box. Thus, it is impractical for the adversary to generate a desired obfuscation
key for another device using synthetic biometric signals.
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5.2 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we introduced the first ever biometric system implementation that
utilizes reconfigurability, bitstream obfuscation, strong PUFs, and PUF challenge-
response predication models. The non-invertibility, non-linkability, and informa-
tion security of keys used by the proposed approach made it resistant to many
common attacks against match-on card/device biometric systems. Aside from
introducing BLOcKeR, this perspective chapter offers an analysis of its security.
In future, we will develop noise-tolerant bitstream obfuscation approaches and
analyze them with respect to overhead and vulnerability to attacks.
Chapter 6
Presentation Attacks Against Electrocardiogram (ECG)
Compared with conventional authentication techniques, such as digital passwords,
personal identification numbers, and smartcards/tokens, biometrics provide a
more robust method for identifying a person, i.e., based on their distinctive phys-
ical characteristics. Biometrics can also be considered more seamless and conve-
nient, especially for continuous authentication. That being said, it has already
been demonstrated that many of the most popular biometric modalities (iris, face,
fingerprint, and speech) can be spoofed and are, therefore, vulnerable to presen-
tation attacks [102], [31], [38], [23], [5], [12], [107], [83], [80], [27].
Over the past decade, alternative modalities based on biological signals have
been explored and their resistance to presentation attacks is often highlighted
as a major attribute. Notable examples include electrocardiogram (ECG) [20],
photoplethysmogram (PPG) [47], and electroencephalogram (EEG) [60], which
possess high distinctiveness, are difficult to replicate, and provide intrinsic liveness
detection. Among them, ECG has received the most attention and is beginning to
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gain larger acceptance from the biometrics community. For instance, ECG-based
authentication systems, such as the Nymi wristband [69], are already coming to
the market. ECG is a recording of the electric potential, generated by the electric
activity of the heart, on the surface of the thorax that represents the extra cellular
electric behavior of the cardiac muscle tissue.
A typical, healthy ECG signal with different beats is shown in Figure 6.1.
Generally speaking, ECG authentication systems can be categorized based on the
feature extraction method (fiducial point vs. non-fiducial point) as well as the
type of template matching used for classification. Fiducial point feature extrac-
tion relies on an accurate detection of ECG fiducial characteristic points such as
P, Q, R, S, and T waves as shown in Figure 6.1, in order to obtain their relative
amplitude, temporal intervals and morphological features. Non-fiducial point fea-
ture extraction analyzes an ECG in a holistic manner, typically by applying time
or frequency analysis to obtain other statistical features. Despite the interest in
ECG-based authentication, it’s worth noting that ECG suffers from various noise
sources such as motion, electromyography (EMG), and exercise, which can impact
authentication accuracy. In the literature, accuracy lies in the range of 94.3% to
100% [70].
Although ECG has long been considered as unclonable by many researchers [20],
[70], [17], [54], that belief has been challenged recently. To the best of our knowl-
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Fig. 6.1: Waterfall plot of ECG beats collected from the same subject and local-
ization of fiducial points.
edge, [25] is the first work to show how an ECG can be spoofed. Specifically, they
tested a replay attack on the Nymi wristband by using three different types of
devices to generate an ECG waveform: arbitrary waveform generators (AWGs),
computer sound cards, and off-the-shelf audio players. The latter option is cheap,
obtainable in a small form factor, and very effective. They achieve an 81% success
rate when replaying the user’s ECG via the above sources. The authors also con-
sider a case where the ECG template in their possession is captured by a different
biometric sensor other than Nymi’s (e.g., at a physician’s office). They develop
a linear mapping function that transforms a signal recorded from one device, the
source (e.g., physician), to a target device (e.g., Nymi). A 50% success rate is the
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best they were able to achieve when mapping from one source to another.
In this chapter, we go beyond the above replay attack and aim for a full-
fledged ECG presentation attack1. Instead of mapping from one source device
to another, we consider mapping an attacker’s ECG to the authentic user’s ECG
in order to falsely authenticate the attacker. Our approach exploits McSharry et
al.’s [65] non-linear dynamical ECG model to accomplish this. Then, we generate
a linear mapping between the models parameters based on the difference between
fiducial features extracted from the source and target ECGs. There are three other
important differences between this chapter and [25]. First, our method requires
only a single ECG beat (approximately one second) as a template rather than
a long sequence of ECG signals (samples) to compute our mapping functions.
Second, the mapping in [25] was calculated in an offline manner where time and
hardware are unlimited. In this chapter, we also consider an online scenario where
the mapping needs to be computed on-the-fly with limited resources. The offline
scenario is only used as a basis for comparison. Third, we consider different ECG
feature extraction methods (fiducial and non-fiducial) and classification methods
when evaluating the success rate of the proposed attack. Results show that the
proposed presentation attack is successful more than 90% of the time on average
1 Note that while the proposed approach is specific to ECG biometrics, the overall methodol-
ogy might also be applicable to other electro-physiological signals such as EEG, PCG, and PPG
as well.
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in the worst case scenario (i.e., when only one beat of the victims ECG is available
to execute the attack).
6.1 Overview of ECG Presentation Attack
The ECG presentation attack in the context of this chapter can be described
as follows. We assume that there exists an ECG-based biometric system with a
legitimate user enrolled. The legitimate user’s ECG signal is denoted by Y . We
define ECG transformation as the process of learning a mapping function F (·). F
takes as input an attacker’s ECG signal (X) and the authentic user’s signal (Y ),
and outputs a new ECG signal Yˆ that is supposed to closely resemble Y . Note that
we often refer to the legitimate user as the victim and Y as the victim’s record.
In order to capture different resource constraints of the attacker, we consider both
online and offline attacks scenarios which are described in the subsections below.
The following notation is used for the remainder of the chapter:
• A bold capital letter denotes a matrix (e.g., A).
• A vector is represented by a lower case letter that is accented by a right
arrow (e.g., ~a).
• The ith element of a vector is denoted using a circular bracket notation (e.g.,
a(i)).
• We denote the attacker’s ECG by X and the victim’s ECG by Y . The
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attacker’s ECG mapped to the victim’s (an emulation of the victim’s ECG)
is denoted by Yˆ . A vector related to an ECG is denoted by the following
modifier (~a)·). For example, the feature vector of the attacker is denoted by
(~f)X .
• ~c = ~a~b and ~c = ~a × ~b denote element-wise division and multiplication of
vectors respectively (i.e., c(i) = a(i)
b(i)
and d(i) = a(i)b(i)).
6.1.1 Offline attack
An offline ECG presentation attack is illustrated in Figure 6.2. In this case, the
mapping function F is determined using an expensive setup (e.g., PC or server)
and there are no time constraints. The latter also implies that some elements of
processing can be done manually (e.g., extraction of fiducial features in the victim
and attacker ECGs). The main steps are as follows. The attacker’s ECG signal
X and the victim’s record Y are pre-processed, i.e., filtered to remove noise and
segmented into beats. Then, modeling parameters of the attacker’s ECG signal
are extracted. In order to create a mapping function, an optimization problem is
formulated and solved. In this chapter, we minimize the squared Euclidean norm
between the victim’s record and attacker ECG signal (more details in Section 3.3).
The output of the optimization is a mapping function that transforms the
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Fig. 6.2: Block diagrams of offline presentation attacks.
dynamical model parameters of the attacker’s ECG so that they resemble those
of the victim’s. A synthetic ECG signal is generated using McSharry et al.’s [65]
non-linear dynamical ECG model and the transformed parameters. Synthetic
noise is also mixed with the ECG in order to avoid simple presentation attack
detection schemes by the biometric system. This signal Yˆ , an emulated version of
the victim’s ECG derived from the attacker’s, can be stored in a low-cost device
(e.g., audio player of a smart phone [25]) and later provided to an ECG sensor by
the attacker in order to fool the biometric system. Note that this offline attack is
not necessarily a realistic or worthwhile attack. Instead, we use it to represent an
idealized presentation attack to compare with our online version.
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6.1.2 Online attack
The online ECG presentation attack is illustrated in Figure 6.3. In the online
case, the attacker’s ECG is captured, pre-processed, and mapped per segment
using a low-cost hardware platform (e.g., raspberry Pi). After pre-processing,
fiducial point and temporal features are extracted from the victim ECG and each
segment of the attacker’s ECG. Instead of solving an optimization problem, the
fiducial features are compared and a simpler linear mapping function is computed.
Dynamical modeling parameters are extracted from the attacker’s ECG and then
mapped to the victim’s parameters using this function. This process is repeated
for each segment of the attacker’s ECG as it is measured. A synthetic ECG signal
is generated similar to the offline case and played to the biometric sensor via a
low-cost audio player. Compared to the offline case, the online approach is simpler
because it does not require all segments of the ECG and only computes a linear
mapping function. In addition, we shall only use the fiducial features that are
computationally easy to extract.
6.2 ECG Modeling Preliminaries and Mapping Function Generation
6.2.1 ECG Dynamic Model
We introduce an analytical model that considers instantaneous heart rate in order
to align multiple ECG beats. The technique transforms the signal from the time
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Fig. 6.3: Block diagrams of online presentation attacks.
domain to angular domain, where each beat starts at angle θ = −pi and ends at
θ = pi. Figure 6.1 shows an example of ECG beats that have been aligned in the
transformed, angular domain.
We also adopt the non-linear dynamical model proposed by McSharry et
al. [65] to extract parameters from an ECG and generate synthetic ECGs for the
aforementioned presentation attacks. McSharry et al.’s model uses three ordinary
differential equations. It consists of a circular limit cycle of unit radius in the
(x, y) plane around which the trajectory is pushed up and down as it approaches
the P,Q,R, S and T points in the ECG:
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
dx
dt = βx− ωy
dy
dt = βy + ωx
dz
dt = −
∑
i∈P,Q,R,S,T ai∆θiexp[−∆θ
2
i
2b2i
]− (z − z0)
(6.1)
where β = 1 −√x2 + y2, ∆θi = (θ − θi)mod(2pi), θ = tan−1( yx), the angular
position of the elements of x,y range over [−pi, pi], and ω is the angular velocity
of the trajectory as it moves around the limit cycle. z0 is the contribution from
baseline wander and is assumed to be a relatively low frequency signal component
coupled with the respiratory sinus frequency (RSA). The z axis represents the
dynamics of the cardiac signal for the set of different fiducial points where θi is
the location of the fiducial (PQRST) points, ω represents heart rate, ai and bi
are amplitude and variance of fiducial points for model parameters respectively
(i ∈ {P,Q,R, S, T}). The above dynamic state equations can also be transformed
into polar coordinates as follows [86]
dr
dt = r(1− r)
dθ
dt = ω
dx
dt = −
∑
i∈P,Q,R,S,T ai∆θiexp[−∆θ
2
i
2b2i
]− (z − z0)
(6.2)
where r and θ are the radial and angular state variables in polar coordinates. The
transformation of Eq.(6.1) to Eq.(6.2) makes the second and third equations (6.2)
to be independent from r. Since we align an ECG signal by individual beats,
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we can eliminate the baseline component z − z0 . This leaves the dynamics of
Z as only a simple derivative of a sum of Gaussians, and it is possible to get an
analytical solution of Z
Z(θ) = −
∑
i∈P,Q,R,S,T
αiexp(−(θ − θi)
2
2b2i
) (6.3)
where αi =
aib
2
i
ω
are the peak amplitude of the Gaussian functions used for model-
ing each of the ECG components. The analytical solution reduces z(t) to Z(θ), as
a given ECG beat with known angular position θk = ωtk. z(θ) is basically a sum
of Gaussian functions with means of each Gaussian at θi (fiducial point locations
of the PQRST complex).
6.2.2 ECG Noise Model
The three main types of noise sources in raw ECG signals are (1) motion artifacts
(MA) which occur due to poor contact to the sensor; (2) baseline wander (BW)
caused by body movement; and (3) electromyography (EMG) due to electrical
activity of muscles, which is often non-stationary in time. In the context of this
chapter, noise impacts ECG authentication as well as our ability to extract dy-
namical parameters, fiducial points, and determine optimal mapping functions.
Hence, it is important to have an ECG model with the flexibility to add/remove
noise before and after mapping.
We use a time-varying auto-regressive (AR) parametric model to learn the
143
noise parameters from the attacker’s ECG signal. For the discrete time series of
noise y(n), a time-varying AR model of order p can be written as follows
y(n) = −
p∑
i=1
an(i)y(n− i) + e(n) (6.4)
where e(n) is the observation error and coefficients an(i) (i = 1, . . . , p) are the
p time-varying AR parameters at the time instance of n. By defining ~ηn =
[an(1), an(2), . . . , an(p)] as a state vector, and ~hn = [y(n−1), y(n−2), . . . , y(n−p)]
as the observation model, we can formulate the problem of AR parameter estima-
tion in the Kalman Smoother (KS) form
y(n) = ~hn~η
T
n + e(n) (6.5)
The progress of the state (i.e., the AR parameters) ~ηn when no prior information
is available is typically described by a random walk model
~ηn+1 = ~ηn + ~ωn (6.6)
where ~ωn is the state noise term. Equations (6.5) and (6.6) form the state-space
signal model for the time-varying AR process y(n) and the evaluation of the AR
parameters can now be estimated by using the Kalman Smoother algorithm [39].
Note that when determining the mapping function, the victim’s ECG record
and attacker’s ECG are both filtered to remove noise. Once the mapping func-
tion is ready, a noise-free synthetic ECG is generated using the dynamical model
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and mapped parameters. Since ECG signals are inherently noisy, a simple anti-
spoofing technique would likely be able to detect a presentation attack due to
lack of noise in the synthetic ECG. Hence, the noise parameters acquired by KF
smoothing are used to regenerate noise and mix it with the synthetic ECG.
6.2.3 Mapping Function Creation and Application
In this section, we illustrate the process of mapping ECG signals from the attacker
to the victim. Since the victim ECG signal corresponds to the one enrolled in the
biometric system, the attacker’s mapped signal must be transformed in order to
execute a presentation attack. To this end, we consider both online and offline
attack scenarios for creating and applying the mapping function to mimic the
victim’s ECG signal.
(1) Online mapping function: Our online mapping function is based on an
observation that there is a linear relationship between fiducial features of an ECG
signal and the dynamical model parameters from Eq.(6.3). Figure 6.4 shows a
set of 35 fiducial features that are often extracted when analyzing ECGs. For
reasons that will be clear later, we divide them into three classes: 1) fiducial
points excluding onsets and offsets (#1 to #15), 2) fiducial point amplitudes
(#16 to #29), and 3) onsets and offsets (#30 to #35).
To uncover the above observation, we vary the dynamical model parameters
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(a) (b)
Fig. 6.4: (a) Electrocardiogram (ECG) PQRST complex and fiducial character-
istic points, (b) 35 fiducial feature extracted for each ECG beat.
by type (θi, αi, bi∀i) and analyze the impact on each fiducial feature. The results
are shown in Figures 6.5 and 6.6. In both figures, each dynamical model parameter
is scaled by a factor (0.9−0.5). Figures 6.5(a-c) show how the ECG changes when
scaling α, b, and θ parameters respectively. Figure 6.6(a-c) shows how scaling
these same parameters changes the fiducial points. As shown in Figure 6.6 (a), the
amplitudes (features 16 to 29) possess a linear relationship with the α parameters.
In contrast, the onset and offset of fiducial point ECG features (features 30 to
35) are translated linearly by scaling factors associated with b parameters (see
Figure 6.6(b)). Finally, Figure 6.6 (c) shows a similar relationship between θ
parameters and the PQRST complex fiducial points (features 1 to 15).
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 6.5: Impact of ECG signal by changing dynamical model parameters: (a)
decreasing α parameters, (b) decreasing b parameters, and (c) decreas-
ing θ parameters.
Based on the above observation, a simple mapping function can be con-
structed from a single heartbeat (segment) of X using the following methodol-
ogy. Assume fiducial features are extracted from victim’s record Y (assumed
to be one segment for simplicity) and a segment from X. We represent a fea-
ture vector as ~f = [~fθ, ~fα, ~fb] where fθ(i), fα(i), and fb(i) correspond to fea-
tures 1-15, 16-29, and 30-35 respectively. Also, we denote the victim and at-
tacker feature vectors by (~f)Y and (~f)X respectively. Similarly, there also ex-
ist vectors of dynamical model parameters represented by ~d = [~dθ, ~dα, ~db] where
~du = [up, uQ, uR, uS, uT ]
T , u ∈ {θ, α, b}. Note that based on the above discussion,
it is convenient to divide both ~f and ~d in this manner due to the relationship
between θ parameters and features 1-15, α parameters and features 16-20, and so
forth.
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We define the scaling vectors ~τ = (
~f)Y
(~f)X
and ~γ = (
~d)Y
(~d)X
. As discussed above,
there is a linear relationship between these scaling factors
~γ = S~τ + ~o (6.7)
S =

A(5×15) 0(5×14) 0(5×6)
0(5×15) B(5×14) 0(5×6)
0(5×15) 0(5×14) C(5×6)

(6.8)
where matrices A, B, and C relate fiducial scaling factors to scaling factors for
dynamical parameters θ, α, and b respectively. Similarly, ~o is an offset.
The above implies that, given (~f)Y , (~f)X , and (~d)X , one can compute (~d)Yˆ
as follows
(~d)Y = ~γ × (~d)X
(~d)Yˆ ≈ (S~τ + ~o)× (~d)X
(~d)Yˆ ≈
(
S
(~f)Y
(~f)X
+ ~o
)
× (~d)X
(6.9)
The above mapping method relies on a linear transformation between sets
of fiducial ECG features from one beat, and can be easily implemented on very
low-cost hardware (e.g., raspberry pi). In practice, however, it is difficult to
extract features 30 to 35 (corresponding to offsets and onsets). Thus, in our
results section, we base our mapping on features 1 to 29 in order to compute ~dYˆ .
Note that the above approach operates on a single segment (heartbeat) of the
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attacker. Therefore, we must apply it to each segment of X separately in our
later experiments.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 6.6: Impact of fiducial ECG features by changing dynamical model param-
eters: (a) decreasing α parameters, (b) decreasing b parameters, and
(c) decreasing θ parameters.
(1) Offline mapping function: The online approach is limited by the fact that
(~d)Yˆ is computed using a linear transform and does not include b fiducial features.
To deal with this issue, we formulate a non-linear optimization problem that finds
a better mapping without the need to extract fiducial features. While it is more
flexible and accurate, we may only apply it in offline scenarios because it requires
more time and segments of X to compute.
The optimization problem is given as follows:
[V ∗, ~p∗] = arg min
pi∑
θ=−pi
||Y (θ)− Z(θ; (~d)Yˆ ))||2, (6.10)
where || · || denotes the Euclidean norm and ∗ denotes the parameters of the
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optimal solution. In our results section, we use a linear mapping function (~d)Yˆ =
V (~d)X + ~p, but nonlinear functions can also be used in this formulation and shall
be investigated in future work. The Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm was used to
solve the non-linear least-squares optimization problem.
Fig. 6.7: Application of mapping function for presentation attack.
Once a mapping function (either online or offline) is obtained, we can apply
it to the attacker’s ECG signal X to generate spoofed ECG signal Yˆ . Application
of the mapping function to the signal is shown in Figure 6.7. First, the attacker’s
signal is pre-processed by employing a 4th order of Butterworth band pass filter
with cutoff frequency 1Hz-40Hz. After that, the mapping function is applied to
the filtered ECG signal in order to obtain new dynamic parameters. Based on
the new parameters, a synthetic ECG signal is generated using McSharry et al.’s
model (see Section 3.1). Meanwhile, the noise in X is modeled as described in
Section 3.2 and then used to generate symmetric noise which is mixed with the
synthetic ECG. The final output is a synthetic ECG signal Yˆ with noise that is
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meant to emulate the victim’s signal.
6.3 Experimental Results
In this section, we present the results obtained from our proposed attack with two
popular feature extraction techniques.
6.3.1 Experimental Setup
ECG Data: The ECG recordings of 52 subjects from the Physikalisch-Technische
Bundesanstalt (PTB) database [71] are selected and a template database is pre-
pared. Each signal is digitized at 1000 samples per second, with 16 bit resolution
and an average of two minutes using a single lead ECG. We also evaluated our pro-
posed methods with public ECGID database (90 subjects, selected 2 records per
subject that were collected on the same day). However, our proposed approaches
can be applied to other ECG databases as well.
Feature Extraction: Two popular feature extraction techniques are applied in
this chapter.
(1) Fiducial feature extraction: A subset of 29 features that represent the majority
of fiducial features are extracted from every beat of each individual’s ECG signal.
As shown in figure 6.4, features encompass 21 fiducial points and 14 temporal
features. To extract these features, first the R peak and then the P, Q, S, T peaks
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and valleys are detected using a local maximum/minimum searching algorithm
within a defined physical region. However, note that feature numbers 30 to 35 are
not considered in mapping or classification because they are difficult to extract.
(2) Normalized Autocorrelation (AC): The motivation behind this non-fiducial ap-
proach is the use of normalized autocorrelation (AC) method on non-overlapping
windows of the filtered individual ECG signal without the use of fiducial point
detection [79]. In order to extract the feature vector representing the ECG’s
signature, a windowed ECG signal and estimation of the normalized AC over a
window of m are taken into account. In fact, autocorrelation gives an automatic
shift invariant feature set that represents repetitive characteristics over multiple
heartbeat cycles. The autocorrelation coefficients can be written as
Rˆxx(m) =
1
Rˆxx(0)
N−|m|−1∑
i
s(i)s(i+m) (6.11)
where s(i) is the windowed ECG signal at time i, s(i + m) ] is the time shifted
version of the windowed ECG with a time lag of m which is greater than the mean
QRS duration
Classification: We apply a one-class support vector machine (SVM) technique
for classification. The basic training principal of SVM is to find the optimal hyper-
plane that separates the classes with a maximum margin [6]. In order to train the
SVM, we use 40 different test samples (heartbeats) for any victim’s ECG. In the
results below, we take every subject as an attacker and consider the rest as victims.
152
In other words, we apply the attack 52× 51 = 8, 010 times for PTB database and
90 × 89 = 2, 652 times for ECGID database. Unless otherwise specified, one can
assume the presented results represent an average. The libSVM library [11] is
used for our experiments.
Experiment Parameters: We consider both cross-subjects attacks and cross-
device attacks. In the cross-subjects attacks we consider three cases.
In case I, the victim’s record in only one beat long and one emulated beat is
generated for authentication. In case II, we increase the number of samples (beats)
contained in the victim’s record while still using only one beat to authenticate. In
case III, we assume the victim’s record is one beat long, but increase the number of
samples used to authenticate the attacker. In case IV, we present across different
devices attack.
Three error rates are used to evaluate the attack performance: false pos-
itive/accept rate (FPR), true positive/accept rate (TPR) and equal error rate
(EER). FPR is the percentage of attackers who were denied access to the system
whereas TRP is the percentage of attackers who have successfully gained access to
the system. The two error rates FPR and TPR can be traded-off with each other
in order to find the optimal and desired EER. EER is the location on the receiver
operator characteristic (ROC) curve where the FPR and TPR are equal. We also
calculate the accuracy for each subject as the number of successful attempts by
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the attacker divided by the total number of attempts.
6.3.2 Cross-Subjects Attacks
Instead of mapping from one source device to another, we consider mapping an
attacker’s ECG to the authentic user’s ECG in order to falsely authenticate the
attacker. Instead of mapping from one source device to another, we consider
mapping an attacker’s ECG to the authentic user’s ECG in order to falsely au-
thenticate the attacker. Our approach exploits a non-linear dynamical ECG model
to accomplish this. Our technique requires only a single ECG beat (approximately
one second) as a template rather than a long sequence of ECG signals (samples)
to compute our mapping functions.
ROC curves are shown in Figure 6.8 (a-d) for the case where only one beat
of victim’s ECG signal is used to create the mapping function. As shown in
this figure 6.8 (a-b), the average accuracy of fiducial feature extraction for both
online and offline attacks is 96.69% versus 97.43% while performing five-fold cross
validation. In contrast, non-fiducial feature extraction obtains 91.78% and 94.17%
rate of success for online and offline attacks based on PTB database.
As shown in figure 6.8 (c-d), the average accuracy of fiducial feature extrac-
tion for both online and offline attacks is 91.07% versus 93.41% while performing
five-fold cross validation based on ECGID database. In contrast, non-fiducial fea-
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Fig. 6.8: (a), (c) ROC curves (log-log scale) for nonfiducial feature extraction un-
der both online and offline attack based on PTB and ECGID database
respectively; (b), (d) ROC curves for fiducial feature extraction under
both online and offline attacks based on PTB and ECGID database
respectively.
ture extraction obtains 86.38% and 88.87% rate of success for online and offline
attacks.
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As expected, the offline attacks perform better than online attacks in terms
of accuracy because the online mapping does not involve the entire ECG (ignores b
parameters). However, it should be noted that the online attack’s performance is
quite comparable to the more advanced offline attack. In addition, the proposed
approach has better success for fiducial feature extraction compared with non-
fiducial. The characteristics of fiducial features (e.g. temporal and amplitude)
generally make them more distinguishable compared to non-fiducial; thus higher
accuracy is expected. This is true for both offline and online attacks.
In order to analyze the performance of authentication, we also study the
accuracy of different subjects. The distribution of accuracy percentage across
subjects for different attacks is shown in Figures 6.9(a-d). The average accuracy
for fiducial feature extraction are 97.43% and 96.69% for offline and online cases
respectively; while for non-fiducial accuracies are 94.17% and 91.78%. We find
that some subjects are more difficult to execute presentation attacks on than
others. This can be explained by two reasons. First, when only one beat of the
victim’s signal is used to generate the mapping function, the selected beat we’ve
chosen might contain more noise compared to other subjects. Second, the noise
mixed with the signal could also impact the authentication accuracy. Although we
have added noise to the synthetic ECG (in order to avoid trivial detection of the
presentation attack), the noise is modeled from the attacker’s ECG signal instead
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of the victim’s since we have no way of emulating the intra-beat variation/noise
of victim’s ECG signal (i.e., heart rate variability).
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 6.9: Distribution of accuracy across subjects for fiducial feature extraction
in (a) offline and (b) online modes; distribution of accuracy for non-
fiducial feature extraction in (c) offline and (d) online modes.
By investigating the subjects with higher accuracy and lower accuracy, this
hypothesis was confirmed; Attacker ECGs with similar in heart rate and heart
rate variability to the victim have a higher accuracy. In addition, we also note
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that subjects with lower accuracy for fiducial methods are correlated with the
subjects with lower accuracy for non-fiducial methods (not explicitly shown for
brevity).
6.3.3 Case II
To overcome the above heart rate variability issue, we also investigate the impact
of mapping when multiple ECG beats of the victim are available for mapping. In
Figure 6.10(c), the number of heartbeats (samples) is varied from 1 to 20. It can
be observed that the EER decreases as the number of samples increases, which
agrees with what we expect based on the above discussion. For non-fiducial fea-
ture extraction, the worst EERs for offline and online attacks (0.0372 & 0.0473)
occur when the victim’s record has only 1 beat. This improves by a factor of ap-
proximately 6 for 20 beats. Furthermore, the EERs for fiducial feature extraction
improve by factors of 13 and 8 respectively when increasing from 1 beat to 20.
6.3.4 Case III
Figures 6.11 (a-d) show the accuracy and EER versus number of samples used to
authenticate the attacker. In general, the impact of noise on accuracy often lessens
with more samples for most applications. The figure shows that this trend holds
even in the case of our emulated attacker ECGs. As the length of the ECG used
to authenticate the attacker increases, the EER falls and the accuracy increases
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Fig. 6.10: EER based on training the mapping function for different number of
victim heartbeats in all attack scenarios.
before eventually saturating. We were be able to achieve the accuracy of 99.64%
and 99.51% for fiducial feature extraction based on offline and online attacks
receptively. 98.27% and 96.71% accuracy for non-fiducial feature are obtained
based on offline and online attacks.
6.3.5 Cross-Device Attacks
Preliminaries
Before introducing cross-device attacks, the most common ECG sensor for mea-
suring heart signals are introduced here. The clinical ECG sensor with 15-leads
is shown in Figure 6.12) [63]. Leads I, II and III are called the limb leads. The
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 6.11: Accuracy (red) and EER (blue) vs. numbers of heartbeats used during
authentication. (a) & (b) show a comparison for offline attacks using
non-fiducial and fiducial feature extraction, respectively; (c) & (d)
show a comparison for online attacks using non-fiducial and fiducial
feature extraction respectively.
electrodes that form these signals are located on the limbsone on each arm and one
on the left leg. The limb leads form the points of what is known as Einthoven’s
triangle.
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Fig. 6.12: The projections of the lead vectors of 15-lead ECG system in three or-
thogonal planes when one assumes the volume conductor to be spher-
ical homogeneous and the cardiac source centrally located.
Leads aVR, aVL, and aVF are the augmented limb leads. They are derived
from the same three electrodes as leads I, II, and III, but they use Goldberger’s
central terminal as their negative pole. Goldberger’s central terminal is a combi-
nation of inputs from two limb electrodes, with a different combination for each
augmented lead. It is referred to immediately below as “the negative pole”.
The precordial leads lie in the transverse (horizontal) plane, perpendicular
to the other six leads. The six precordial electrodes act as the positive poles for
the six corresponding precordial leads: (V1, V2, V3, V4, V5 and V6). Wilson’s
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central terminal is used as the negative pole. Vectorcardiography (sometimes
abbreviated as VCG) is a method of recording the magnitude and direction of the
electrical forces that are generated by the heart by means of a continuous series of
vectors that form curving lines around a central point which called Frank leads.
Mapping Function
In this section, we describes the process of generating attack signals for the cross-
device attack using ECG data from different sources. The method is based on
the offline attack, i.e., functions that transform signals recorded from one device
(called ’source’) to resemble the morphology of the signals from a target device.
In our case, the target device corresponds to the lead I that was mentioned in
subsection 6.3.5. In other words, we aim to find a function that, given an input
(ECG signal from a source device) will be able to produce the “same” signal as if
it was recorded on the target device.
Case IV
We provide a systematic attack against ECG biometrics by mapping from one
source device to another demonstrate its effectiveness of the attack. We then
compared the results of our method with [25]. Our method has two great advan-
tages. First it only requires a single ECG beat (approximately one second) as a
template rather than a long sequence of ECG signals (samples) to compute our
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mapping functions. Second, our mapping function significantly outperforms the
existing state-of-the-art. We present a comparison between our mapping function
and [25] in figure 6.13. The success rate of 66.01% based on limb leads has been
achieved when we have employed the technique stated in [25], while our own ap-
proach perform much better in terms of accuracy. Based on our experiments, 96%
success rate has been obtained and 70% & 73% success rate are obtained based
on precordial and frank leads sensor respectively. On the other hand, only 56.71%
and 64.74% success rate are obtained based on NDSS paper [25]. ‘
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Fig. 6.13: (a) ROC curves (log-log scale) for nonfiducial feature extraction under
our mapping function; (b) ROC curves for nonfiducial feature extrac-
tion under NDSS paper technique.
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6.3.6 Countermeasure
We propose two countermeasure to prevent presentation attack on ECG biometric.
Countermeasures take advantage from the nature of ECG signal such as heart rate
variability (HRV) and noise that enable biometric systems to detect fake samples
and reject them. As can be seen in figure 6.14, using different countermeasure
such as heart rate variability and signal-to-noise ratio success rate are degraded.
We have evaluated countermeasure under both fiducial and nonfiducial feature
extraction techniques. As can be seen in figure 6.14(c) and figure 6.14(d), without
having knowledge of heart rate variability, the attacker cannot map attacker’s
ECG variation into victim’s ECG signal. Therefore, the success rate is decreased
when an attacker has access to more heartbeats. At 0dB, the success rate is
degraded to 88% for fiducial feature extraction. In addition, the success rate with
HRV knowledge is 95%, while without HRV knowledge it is degraded to 81.87%
based on fiducial feature extraction.
However, in some cases, attacker’s HRV may have a similar heart rate to
victim’s ECG signal. Therefore, we identify subjects with the similar HRV and
then change the attacker’s HRV in the mapping function. We found that by
modifying HRV of victim’s ECG signal, the success rate is degraded. For instance,
the success rate in this case has been decreased to 60% based on fiducial feature.
Moreover, the non-fiducial feature extraction is more sensitive to countermeasure
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where the success rate is 51.41%. In addition, we have considered different SNR
as a countermeasure technique. To do that, we applied 20dB, 10dB, 5dB, and 0dB
SNR in ECG signal in order to evaluate attacks success rate. As can be seen in
figure 6.14(a-b), by decreasing the SNR value, the success rate is decreased under
both fiducial and nonfiducial feature extraction.
6.4 Conclusion
In this work, we have proposed a presentation attack on ECG-based biometric
systems. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to explore the
vulnerability of ECG biometric by applying a systematic mapping function that
transforms any attacker’s ECG signal to a victim’s. We evaluate the presenta-
tion attack on both offline and online attacks for two popular feature extraction
methods (fiducial and non-fiducial). In our experiments, the proposed online ap-
proach achieves success rates over 90% with limited training data. When more
training samples of the victim ECG are available to the attacker, the success rate
rises to over 96%. The performance of the resource constrained online approach
is even comparable to the online approach. We also consider cases where the
victim’s ECG has been recorded by a different source device called cross-device
attack. In future work, we plan on implementing the proposed online approach
in real hardware and evaluating different nonlinear mapping functions for offline
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Fig. 6.14: ROC curve of success rate presentation attack on the proposed Coun-
termeasure (a),(b) signal-to noise (SNR) ratio for fiducial and non-
fiducial feature extraction respectively, (c), (d) HRV for fiducial and
nonfiducial feature extraction respectively.
scenarios.
Chapter 7
Human Recognition from Photoplethysmography (PPG)
Photoplethysmography (PPG) signals have unique identity properties for human
recognition, and are becoming easier to capture by emerging IoT sensors. Existing
research on PPG-based biometric systems rely on fiducial methods that extract
landmarks from the PPG signal as features. The goal of this chapter is to develop
more robust approaches for processing PPGs and classifying individuals. All the
above approaches rely on fiducial characteristics (i.e., landmarks) obtained from
PPG signals in the time domain. Non-fiducial methods have had better success
in biometric systems for electrocardiogram (ECG) [48], [49] and to our knowledge
have not been applied to PPGs.
Gu et al. [37] was the first group to investigate PPG for user authentication.
They considered four feature parameters and achieved 94% accuracy. More re-
cently, Kavsaolu et al. [51] proposed a feature ranking algorithm based on 40 time
domain features, acquired from first and second derivatives of the PPG signal and
achieved 94.44% accuracy. In 2016, [10] proposed 12 time domain features from
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PPG and its derivatives.
We compare PPG-based human verification of 42 subjects with fiducial and
non-fiducial methods (specifically, discrete wavelet transform) and classification
using a neural network and support vector machine. The experimental results
demonstrate higher test recognition rates for wavelet transform feature extraction.
We further improve our results by selecting a subset of features via the genetic
algorithm. In addition, different machine learning techniques are used to compare
non-fiducial and fiducial feature extractions.
Fig. 7.1: Block diagram of the proposed PPG authentication system.
7.1 Proposed PPG Authentication System
Our PPG biometric authentication system is shown in Figure 7.1. First, PPG
signals are captured by a PPG sensor and pre-processed to remove noise. Next,
peak detection of the PPG signal is used in order to divide the PPG into different
168
segments (beats). After segmentation and normalization, feature extraction is
applied. The resulting features are processed by a two-step approach to reduce
dimensionality and correlation. Finally, classification is applied to distinguish
genuine and imposer PPG data.
(a) (b)
Fig. 7.2: (a) A normal PPG, (b) Power spectrum of PPG.
7.1.1 Pre-processing
There are various sources of artifacts that interfere with PPG signal acquisition
including baseline wander (BW), motion artifact (MA), and respiration. PPG
signal spans frequencies between 0.5 Hz to 5 Hz (Fig. 7.2 (b)). In this chapter,
a third order Butterworth band pass filter with cutoff frequency 1Hz-5Hz was
deployed to reduce the effect of noise. Segmentation is necessary to extract dis-
criminative features from data as input to classification models. We have created
PPG segments by identifying the systolic peak of each beat using a modified Pan
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Tompkins peak detection algorithm. Since there are variations between segments,
we normalize each segment in terms of maximum amplitude and time.
Fig. 7.3: Coiflet results based on different PCA dimensions.
Fiducial Features
In fiducial point methods, the most often used features are based on local land-
marks of heart beats such as temporal or amplitude difference between consecutive
fiducial landmarks. For PPG, the fiducial features are often determined from the
original PPG signal and its second derivative. In Figure 7.4, the relationship
between PPG signal and its second derivative is shown. In Figure 7.4,the main
landmarks are shown- systolic peak, dicrotic notch, and diastolic peak. From the
PPGs second derivative, the a and b points are the first peak and valley respec-
tively. The c, d, e points occur after the location of the systolic peak and have
much smaller amplitude. Even with pre-processing, peak detection can be unde-
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pendable especially in the case of c, d, and e. If the peaks cannot be extracted
at all, the PPG biometric system will require more segments in order to identify
the individual which impacts its usability and convenience. On the other hand,
noise in the peaks can also impact the accuracy of identification, resulting in false
positives and false negatives.
Non-fiducial Features
Non-fiducial methods of feature extraction can overcome the above limitations
of landmark extraction. In this chapter, our approach only requires extraction
of the systolic peak in order to segment the PPG. The systolic peak is easier to
successfully identify than any of the other landmarks in practice. Once this peak
is extracted, we take a window around it in each segmented PPG. The Discrete
Wavelet Transforms (DWT) is the non-fiducial method of choice for ECG and
is used to extract more reliable features for PPG in this chapter. The wavelet
(a) (b)
Fig. 7.4: Plots illustrating (a) PPG signal (b) Second derivative PPG.
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transform is a linear operation that transforms a signal by decomposing it into
various scales. The signal is passed through a series of high and low pass filter
in order to analyze both high as well as low frequency components. The discrete
wavelet transform (DWT) is defined by
y[n] =
∞∑
k=−∞
x[k]ψ[n− k] (7.1)
where the x[k] and ψ represent the analyzed signal and mother wavelet. PPG
signal decomposition is basically done in an iterative fashion using the different
scales s = 2, 4, 8, ..., 2L, in fact the signal is broken down into many lower resolution
components. In this work, Daubechies wavelet of order 4 (db4) with four levels of
decomposition is used for feature extraction.
7.2 Two-Step Feature Selection
The resulting feature vector may have correlation and high dimensionality, which
makes it unsuitable for resource-constrained systems (e.g., wearables) and pro-
duces high false rejection rate. Thus, we have employed a two-step feature selec-
tion in order to reduce the dimension of the features. In our method, Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (KS-test) correlation based filter is applied to remove correlated features.
A feature is considered to be good if it is highly correlated to the class but not to
any other features. Second, Kernel PCA (KPCA) [87], a nonlinear technique is
used for dimensionality reduction. We have investigated 10, 20, 30 and 40 dimen-
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sions to find the best dimension for our work. We find that the authentication
accuracy improves as dimensionality decreases. Based on experimental results
(Fig. 7.3), we use a 10 dimensional feature vector for later results.
7.3 PPG-based Classification
Biometric identification can be viewed as a binary classification problem where
enrolled features of each individual can be viewed as one class and samples from
the rest of the population are viewed as other classes. In this chapter, we consider
every subject’s PPG features and employ a different binary classifier so that each
enrolled subject can be recognized by the system. Two different classification
techniques are studied.
7.4 Machine Learning for Classification
Here we have categorized classification techniques into supervised (SVM) and
unsupervised learning (SOM, KNN) methods.
7.4.1 Supervised Learning
Support vector machines (SVMs): SVM has become one of the most popular
supervised learning techniques. In biometric authentication systems, one-class
classification [97] approach is trained by only one class of data, and therefore
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classifiers are designed to distinguish between the one known class and any other
which are unseen during training. One-class SVM classifiers minimize the volume
of the hypersphere which contains the training data (Non-fiducial PPG-based
authentication for healthcare application Non-fiducial PPG-based authentication
for healthcare application Fig. 7.5 (a)). The hypersphere is defined by center
b and a radius R > 0. Minimizing the size of the hypersphere is equivalent to
minimizing R2 as shown in the following quadratic programming problem:
min
R,b,ξ
R2 +
1
Nν
N∑
i=1
ξi (7.2)
Subject to, ||φ(x¯i)− b|| ≤ R2 + ξi (7.3)
Here R and b are parameters determined by solving the above problem and
represent the hypersphere where i = 1, . . . , N. and ξi ≥ 0,. ξi are “slack” variables
that allows for some points to be within the margin in the scenario of a nonexistent
separating hypersphere. ν can be interpreted as the margin of the hypersphere
used to separate the data. The goal of the classification problem is learning an
optimal separable hypersphere known as a decision function. For our purposes,
the RBF kernel is used because the Coiflet wavelet transform feature vectors follow
a Gaussian distribution.
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7.4.2 Unsupervised Learning
(1) k-nearest-neighbors (k-NN) is based on the minimum distance of the
sample features to the training features. Consider a set of labeled feature vectors
set to train this classifier, and another set of unlabeled feature vectors used for
test purposes (see Fig. 7.5 (b)). The test set is accepted when its local density is
larger or equal to the local density of its nearest neighbor in the training set. As
can be seen in Fig. 7.5 (b), the distance from a test data A to its nearest neighbour
Bj is computed and called D1j. Then average distances of the k nearest neighbors
for Bj to its nearest neighbor in the target sample is computed and called D2. If
D1j/D2 ≥ threshold value, test sample is rejected as an outlier or else accepted as
member of target sample. This simple method is very efficient, especially in high
dimensional feature spaces.
(2) Self-organizing map (SOM): is a single layer feed-forward artificial neural
network and is trained by an unsupervised clustering method. Input vectors
features in SOM are given to the first layer of the network. The second layer
of the network is the output layer depending on the similarities among them.
The construction of the SOM is such that all objects in the feature space retain
their distance as much as possible and neighborhood relations in a mapped space
(Fig. 7.5 (c)). Using this feature, SOM can be used for clustering and classification
of the large amount of input vectors. To evaluate the fitness of test data in this
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(a) (b) (C)
Fig. 7.5: (a) The SVM hypersphere where circles and squares are unknown (out-
lier) and known(target) data respectively and the sphere with solid line
represents dividing boundary, (b) topological structure of k-NN scheme,
(c) and structural graph of SOM neural network where the circles are
neurons.
model, a reconstruction error is considered that defines the difference between an
object and its closest cluster center (neuron) in the SOM.
7.5 Experimental Results
7.5.1 Database
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the PPG authentication and the proposed
non-fiducial feature extraction, a publically available Capnobase IEEE TBME
benchmark dataset [50] was used. The raw PPG signals are 8 minutes long with
300 Hz sample rate for 42 healthy subjects.
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7.5.2 Metrics for Evaluation
In order to evaluate the performance of PPG authentication, several experiments
were carried out. We divided the data-set (subject features) into a training and
a test set. The training set is used to train the classifiers and to tune their
parameters. We then test the classifiers on the data that has not been seen by
the classifiers during training time. In training set, we only consider genuine
data (authentic users) while in the test sets impostors are also included. Here,
we have employed 95% of subjects as an impostor (outlier) and 5% of subjects
as genuine (target). Our evaluation metric involves the false positive/acceptance
rate (FPR/FAR) and the true positive/acceptance rate (TPR/TAR). FAR refers
to the rate at which a classifier incorrectly matches impostor data (outlier) to
the target class. TAR refers to the rate that a classifier correctly matches the
genuine data (target) to the target class. The two error rates FAR and false
negative/reject rate (FNR/FRR) can be traded-off with each other. At the cost
of missing out some imposers, one can reduce FAR by making the classifiers less
sensitive; at the cost of more false negatives, one can increase the probability of
detecting intruders. In order to account the usability-security trade off, we report
the equal error rate (EER) in all experiments. This is the error rate the classifier
where FAR equals FRR.
In addition for evaluating the performance of biometric PPG authentication,
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receiver operating characteristic (ROC) and EER curves are considered in this
chapter (see Fig 7.6). The ROC curve represents the trade-off between FAR and
FRR, while EER is generally adopted as a unique measure for characterizing the
performance level of a biometric system. The EER can be seen in the figure where
the FAR and FRR cross each other.
7.5.3 Discussion
In our evaluation, the target data is randomly chosen. For different classification
sets with the same percentage of all the data, we get different results in each
iteration. For characterizing a classification set of a given size, the experiments
were conducted for 50 random trials. Then, the average, standard deviation (STD)
of accuracy, and EER are calculated. The classification accuracy and EER for the
above approaches are summarized in Table 7.1. Coiflet wavelet transform (non-
fiducial) and fiducial feature extractions with different classification are considered
in our experiments. Comparing the results of the non-fiducial and fiducial, it can
clearly be seen that non-fiducial has better performance in terms of accuracy and
EER. For example, in Table 7.1, the standard deviation value of fiducial result
is 15.59 which is much more than non-fiducial one (2.6) since the features are
not recognized well in noisy signals for some of the subjects. Our observation
indicates that unsupervised learning methods have better performance compared
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to supervised ones especially in fiducial feature extraction. It can be observed
that non-fiducial method results in 99.75% of accuracy based on SVM classifier
while fiducial features only succeed in accuracy of 91.46%. Therefore, as shown in
Table 7.1, fiducial features classification accuracy has a lack of approximately 9%
meaning they are more sensitive to noise. This leads to impact the result although
non-fiducial features are far less dependent on peak detection correctness. In more
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 7.6: Receiver operating characteristic (ROC); (a) and (c) nonfiducial feature
extraction, (b) and (d) fiducial feature extraction.
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details, Fig. 7.6 (a) and (c) present the ROC curve results of the authentication for
the non-fiducial PPG performance with EER values 1.46%, 1.31%, and 1.70% for
SVM, k-NN, and SOM respectively. Fig. 7.6 (b) and (d) indicate the ROC curve
results of fiducial PPG authentication with EER of 15.21%, 9.53%, and 11.52%
for SVM, k-NN, and SOM respectively. The results that are shown in Fig. 7.6
can demonstrate that unsupervised learning technique perform better especially
in the case of fiducial feature compared to supervised learning technique.
Table 7.1: Results of authentication
SVM SOM KNN
Non-Fiducial
Acc 99.75± 0.7 99.65± 0.9 99.84± 0.4
EER 1.46± 2.7 1.70± 3.4 1.31± 2.6
Fiducial
Acc 91.46± 15.24 92.96± 15.44 93.76± 15.59
EER 15.35± 20.22 11.52± 15.84 9.53± 15.92
Overall, the results of the experiments show that it is possible to perform
PPG biometric authentication without the use of PPG fiducial detection. The
non-fiducial method provides an efficient, robust, and computationally efficient
authentication technique in healthcare application.
7.6 Conclusion
Biometrics can protect the confidentiality of medical records through healthcare
provider authentication. In this chapter, we present non-fiducial and fiducial
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feature extraction for photoplethysmography (PPG) based authentication. Our
results indicate that two-step feature selection technique can give a degree of free-
dom to remove the correlated feature that may have impact on authentication
performance. Supervised and unsupervised machine learning techniques are con-
sidered for authentication evaluation. The experimental results show that 99.84%
accuracy with EER of 1.31% can be achieved based on non-fiducial feature extrac-
tion. This outperforms the fiducial based approaches is prior work by a significant
margin.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
Given the dramatic increase in incidents involving identity thefts and various
security threats in IoT systems, it is imperative to have reliable identity manage-
ment systems. Biometric systems are being widely used to achieve reliable user
authentication, a critical component in identity management, however, they are
vulnerable to a number of attacks. Furthermore, the biometric signal suffers from
noise, which may result in key generation errors. In general, the performance in
biometric authentication is determined by two kinds of variability among the ac-
quired biometric templates. The first one is the variations of the same biometric
trait from the same user is called intra-class variation which determines minimum
false reject rate (FRR) and as opposed to inter-class variation which relates to
different users, whose lower limit sets a minimum false accept rate (FAR).
This thesis has provided an in-depth study and experimental results from
hardware/software co-design for biometric authentication and key generation sys-
tems. A successful attempt has been made in this dissertation to cover all different
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fields of investigation by employing various techniques to guarantee maximum se-
curity and efficiency for the Internet of Things environment.
In chapter 3 and 4, we have covered errors in key generation due to sources
of noise and variability in ECG such as power line interface, motion artifact
(MA), baseline wander (BW), electromyography (EMG), and heart rate variability
(HRV). However, our heart is continuously beating and possesses an inter-subject
variability that may be affected by emotion. Emotions are complex processes
comprised of numerous components, including feelings, bodily changes, cognitive
reactions, behavior, and thoughts. In the context of biometric authentication, the
emotional state of a person may be viewed as noise that needs to be removed.
However, this is also valuable information about the person individual character-
istics, i.e., the ECG is also a source of emotional information, since emotions are
accompanied by physiological alterations, namely in the ECG signal. The ques-
tions on how we can obtain an effective solution for ECG biometric key generation
will be solved considering all different aspects of conditions.
While biometrics might have a lot of advantages over traditional passwords,
that doesn’t mean their implementation and use is reliable and secure. Can we
generate a non-invertible and non-linkable biometric template without compro-
mising the matching accuracy? Chapter 5 has allowed us to identify the existing
requirements for innovative biometric applications and their vulnerabilities. In
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this chapter, we have summarized various aspects of biometric system security
and discussed techniques to counter these threats. Among these vulnerabilities,
an attack against stored biometric templates is a major concern due to the strong
linkage between a user’s template and his identity and the irrevocable nature of
biometric templates. We have described our template protection mechanisms pro-
posed in the chapter 5 and highlighted their strengths and limitations. However
we believe that as yet there is no “best” approach for security of biometric.
PPG, which presents the same advantages as ECG compared to fingerprints,
is more simple to acquire than ECG. There exists a relation between them, so there
was an interest to see the potential of PPG for authentication. Nevertheless,
existing research on biometric authentication systems based on PPG is at a very
early stage, not tackling noise associated with it. Most approaches rely on PPG
data and the fiducial of different parts of the PPG waveform. However our non-
fiducial approaches have proved to be also effective, and have the advantage of not
relying critically on the accurate extraction of fiducial data. Nevertheless, none
of the research on PPG based biometric addressing the feasibility of its long-term
usability, impact of age, emotion, blood pressure, heart abnormalities, etc.
As a future work, it would be interesting to explore new techniques for
pre-processing step that would lead to an optimal key generation technique. So
far ECG and PPG biometrics has been selected as the best candidates, however,
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there are other metrics that can be combined in order to achieve a more robust
system. Another open problem for the future research directions could be the idea
of incorporating GANs into presentation attacks against cardiovascular-based bio-
metric systems. Generative adversarial networks (GANs) are a class of artificial
intelligence algorithms used in unsupervised machine learning, implemented by
a system of two neural networks contesting with each other in a zero-sum game
framework. GANs’ potential is huge, because they can learn to mimic any distri-
bution of data.
Bibliography
[1] Andy Adler, Vulnerabilities in biometric encryption systems, International
Conference on Audio-and Video-Based Biometric Person Authentication,
Springer, 2005, pp. 1100–1109.
[2] Foteini Agrafioti, Francis M Bui, and Dimitrios Hatzinakos, Medical biomet-
rics: The perils of ignoring time dependency, Biometrics: Theory, Applica-
tions, and Systems, 2009. BTAS’09. IEEE 3rd International Conference on,
IEEE, 2009, pp. 1–6.
[3] , Medical biometrics in mobile health monitoring, Security and Com-
munication Networks 4 (2011), no. 5, 525–539.
[4] Foteini Agrafioti, Jiexin Gao, and Dimitrios Hatzinakos, Heart biometrics:
Theory, methods and applications, Biometrics, InTech, 2011.
[5] Andre´ Anjos and Se´bastien Marcel, Counter-measures to photo attacks in
face recognition: a public database and a baseline, Biometrics (IJCB), 2011
international joint conference on, IEEE, 2011, pp. 1–7.
[6] Bernhard E Boser, Isabelle M Guyon, and Vladimir N Vapnik, A training
algorithm for optimal margin classifiers, Proceedings of the fifth annual
workshop on Computational learning theory, ACM, 1992, pp. 144–152.
[7] Bob Brown, How to make Fully Homomorphic Encryption ‘practical and
usable’, https://www.cio.com/article/3196872/security/, 2016.
[8] CASIA-IrisV1, http://biometrics.idealtest.org/.
[9] Rajat Subhra Chakraborty and Swarup Bhunia, Harpoon: an obfuscation-
based soc design methodology for hardware protection, IEEE Transactions
on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems 28 (2009),
no. 10, 1493–1502.
185
186
[10] Samik Chakraborty and Saurabh Pal, Photoplethysmogram signal based bio-
metric recognition using linear discriminant classifier, Control, Instrumenta-
tion, Energy & Communication (CIEC), 2016 2nd International Conference
on, IEEE, 2016, pp. 183–187.
[11] Chih-Chung Chang and Chih-Jen Lin, Libsvm: a library for support vector
machines, ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology (TIST)
2 (2011), no. 3, 27.
[12] C. Chen, A. Dantcheva, T. Swearingen, and A. Ross, Spoofing faces using
makeup: An investigative study, 2017 IEEE International Conference on
Identity, Security and Behavior Analysis (ISBA), Feb 2017, pp. 1–8.
[13] Chun Chen and Raymond Veldhuis, Binary biometric representation through
pairwise adaptive phase quantization, EURASIP journal on information se-
curity 2011 (2011), no. 1, 543106.
[14] Chun Chen, Raymond NJ Veldhuis, Tom AM Kevenaar, and Anton HM
Akkermans, Biometric quantization through detection rate optimized bit al-
location, EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing 2009 (2009),
no. 1, 784834.
[15] Jung Hee Cheon and et al., Ghostshell: Secure biometric authentication
using integrity-based homomorphic evaluations., IACR Cryptology ePrint
(2016).
[16] Hyun-Soo Choi, Byunghan Lee, and Sungroh Yoon, Biometric authentica-
tion using noisy electrocardiograms acquired by mobile sensors, IEEE Access
4 (2016), 1266–1273.
[17] Se Young Chun, Single pulse ecg-based small scale user authentication using
guided filtering, Biometrics (ICB), 2016 International Conference on, IEEE,
2016, pp. 1–7.
[18] Devin Coldewey, 5.6 million fingerprints stolen in cyberattack, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/, 2016.
[19] David Roxbee Cox and David Victor Hinkley, Theoretical statistics, CRC
Press, 1979.
[20] Hugo Pla´cido Da Silva, Ana Fred, Andre´ Lourenc¸o, and Anil K Jain, Finger
ecg signal for user authentication: Usability and performance, Biometrics:
Theory, Applications and Systems (BTAS), 2013 IEEE Sixth International
Conference on, IEEE, 2013, pp. 1–8.
187
[21] John Daugman, How iris recognition works, IEEE Transactions on circuits
and systems for video technology 14 (2004), no. 1, 21–30.
[22] , How iris recognition works, The essential guide to image processing,
Elsevier, 2009, pp. 715–739.
[23] Tiago de Freitas Pereira, Andre´ Anjos, Jose´ Mario De Martino, and
Se´bastien Marcel, Can face anti-spoofing countermeasures work in a real
world scenario?, Biometrics (ICB), 2013 International Conference on, IEEE,
2013, pp. 1–8.
[24] Yevgeniy Dodis, Leonid Reyzin, and Adam Smith, Fuzzy extractors: How
to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data, Advances in
cryptology-Eurocrypt 2004, Springer, 2004, pp. 523–540.
[25] Simon Eberz, Andrea Patane´, Nicola Paoletti, Marta Kwiatkowska, Marc
Roeschlin, and Ivan Martinovic, Broken hearted: How to attack ecg biomet-
rics, The Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS),
February 2017.
[26] Editorial, At equifax, a category 5 data breach, www.usatoday.com, 2017.
[27] Serife Kucur Ergu¨nay, Elie Khoury, Alexandros Lazaridis, and Se´bastien
Marcel, On the vulnerability of speaker verification to realistic voice spoof-
ing, Biometrics Theory, Applications and Systems (BTAS), 2015 IEEE 7th
International Conference on, IEEE, 2015, pp. 1–6.
[28] Hao Feng and Chan Choong Wah, Private key generation from on-line
handwritten signatures, Information Management & Computer Security 10
(2002), no. 4, 159–164.
[29] Domenic Forte, Swarup Bhunia, and Mark M Tehranipoor, Hardware pro-
tection through obfuscation, Springer, 2017.
[30] M Freire-Santos, J Fierrez-Aguilar, and J Ortega-Garcia, Cryptographic key
generation using handwritten signature, Biometric Technology for Human
Identification III, vol. 6202, International Society for Optics and Photonics,
2006, p. 62020N.
[31] Javier Galbally, Arun Ross, Marta Gomez-Barrero, Julian Fierrez, and
Javier Ortega-Garcia, From the iriscode to the iris: A new vulnerability
of iris recognition systems, Black Hat Briefings USA (2012).
[32] HA Garcia-Baleon and V Alarcon-Aquino, Cryptographic key generation
from biometric data using wavelets, Electronics, Robotics and Automotive
Mechanics Conference, 2009. CERMA’09., IEEE, 2009, pp. 15–20.
188
[33] Francesco Gargiulo, Antonio Fratini, Mario Sansone, and Carlo Sansone,
Subject identification via ecg fiducial-based systems: Influence of the type of
qt interval correction, Computer methods and programs in biomedicine 121
(2015), no. 3, 127–136.
[34] Blaise Gassend and et al., Silicon physical random functions, Proceedings of
the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communications security, ACM,
2002, pp. 148–160.
[35] Alan S Go, Dariush Mozaffarian, Ve´ronique L Roger, Emelia J Benjamin,
Jarett D Berry, Michael J Blaha, Shifan Dai, Earl S Ford, Caroline S Fox,
Sheila Franco, et al., Heart disease and stroke statistics2014 update: a report
from the american heart association, Circulation 129 (2014), no. 3, e28–
e292.
[36] Ary L Goldberger, Luis AN Amaral, Leon Glass, Jeffrey M Hausdorff, Pla-
men Ch Ivanov, Roger G Mark, Joseph E Mietus, George B Moody, Chung-
Kang Peng, and H Eugene Stanley, Physiobank, physiotoolkit, and physionet
components of a new research resource for complex physiologic signals, Cir-
culation 101 (2000), no. 23, e215–e220.
[37] YY Gu, Y Zhang, and YT Zhang, A novel biometric approach in human
verification by photoplethysmographic signals, Information Technology Ap-
plications in Biomedicine, 2003. 4th International IEEE EMBS Special Topic
Conference on, IEEE, 2003, pp. 13–14.
[38] Priyanshu Gupta, Shipra Behera, Mayank Vatsa, and Richa Singh, On iris
spoofing using print attack, Pattern Recognition (ICPR), 2014 22nd Inter-
national Conference on, IEEE, 2014, pp. 1681–1686.
[39] Simon S Haykin et al., Kalman filtering and neural networks, Wiley Online
Library, 2001.
[40] N Henze and B Zirkler, A class of invariant consistent tests for multivariate
normality, Communications in Statistics-Theory and Methods 19 (1990),
no. 10, 3595–3617.
[41] Anil K Jain and et al., Biometric template security, EURASIP Journal on
Advances in Signal Processing 2008 (2008), 113.
[42] Anil K Jain, Patrick Flynn, and Arun A Ross, Handbook of biometrics,
Springer Science & Business Media, 2007.
[43] Zhe Jin, Andrew Beng Jin Teoh, Bok-Min Goi, and Yong-Haur Tay, Biomet-
ric cryptosystems: A new biometric key binding and its implementation for
189
fingerprint minutiae-based representation, Pattern Recognition 56 (2016),
50–62.
[44] Cagatay Karabat and et al., Thrive: threshold homomorphic encryption
based secure and privacy preserving biometric verification system, EURASIP
Journal on Advances in Signal Processing 2015 (2015), no. 1, 71.
[45] Deniz Karakoyunlu and Berk Sunar, Differential template attacks on puf
enabled cryptographic devices, Information Forensics and Security (WIFS),
2010 IEEE International Workshop on, IEEE, 2010, pp. 1–6.
[46] Robert Karam and et al., Robust bitstream protection in fpga-based systems
through low-overhead obfuscation, ReConFigurable Computing and FPGAs
(ReConFig), 2016 International Conference on, IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–8.
[47] N. Karimian, Z. Guo, M. Tehranipoor, and D. Forte, Human recogni-
tion from photoplethysmography (ppg) based on non-fiducial features, 2017
IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing
(ICASSP), March 2017, pp. 4636–4640.
[48] Nima Karimian and et al., Highly reliable key generation from electrocardio-
gram (ecg), IEEE Transactions on Biomedical Engineering 64 (2017), no. 6,
1400–1411.
[49] , Noise assessment framework for optimizing ecg key generation,
Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), 2017 IEEE International Sym-
posium on, IEEE, 2017, pp. 1–6.
[50] Walter Karlen and et al., Multiparameter respiratory rate estimation from
the photoplethysmogram, IEEE Transactions on Biomedical Engineering 60
(2013), no. 7, 1946–1953.
[51] A Res¸it Kavsaog˘lu, Kemal Polat, and M Recep Bozkurt, A novel feature
ranking algorithm for biometric recognition with ppg signals, Computers in
biology and medicine 49 (2014), 1–14.
[52] Kyeong-Seop Kim and et al., A robust human identification by normalized
time-domain features of electrocardiogram, Engineering in medicine and bi-
ology society, .27th annual international conference of the, IEEE, 2006,
pp. 1114–1117.
[53] Serkan Kiranyaz, Turker Ince, and Moncef Gabbouj, Real-time patient-
specific ecg classification by 1-d convolutional neural networks, IEEE Trans-
actions on Biomedical Engineering 63 (2016), no. 3, 664–675.
190
[54] M. Komeili, W. Louis, N. Armanfard, and D. Hatzinakos, Feature selection
for nonstationary data: Application to human recognition using medical bio-
metrics, IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics PP (2017), no. 99, 1–14.
[55] Andre´ Leier, Christoph Richter, Wolfgang Banzhaf, and Hilmar Rauhe,
Cryptography with dna binary strands, Biosystems 57 (2000), no. 1, 13–22.
[56] Pengfei Li, Yu Wang, Jiangchun He, Lihua Wang, Yu Tian, Tian-shu Zhou,
Tianchang Li, and Jing-song Li, High-performance personalized heartbeat
classification model for long-term ecg signal, IEEE Transactions on Biomed-
ical Engineering 64 (2017), no. 1, 78–86.
[57] Meng-Hui Lim, Andrew Beng Jin Teoh, and Kar-Ann Toh, Dynamic
detection-rate-based bit allocation with genuine interval concealment for
binary biometric representation, Cybernetics, IEEE Transactions on 43
(2013), no. 3, 843–857.
[58] Roel Maes, Physically unclonable functions, Springer, 2016.
[59] Dario Maio and et al., Fvc2004: Third fingerprint verification competition,
Biometric Authentication (2004), 31–35.
[60] E. Maiorana, D. La Rocca, and P. Campisi, On the permanence of eeg signals
for biometric recognition, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and
Security 11 (2016), no. 1, 163–175.
[61] Emanuele Maiorana and et al., Hill-climbing attacks on multibiometrics
recognition systems, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Se-
curity 10 (2015), no. 5, 900–915.
[62] Ste´phane Mallat, A wavelet tour of signal processing, Academic press, 1999.
[63] Jaakko Malmivuo and Robert Plonsey, Bioelectromagnetism: principles and
applications of bioelectric and biomagnetic fields, Oxford University Press,
USA, 1995.
[64] Erik Jan Marinissen and et al., Direct probing on large-array fine-pitch
micro-bumps of a wide-i/o logic-memory interface, Test Conference (ITC),
2014 IEEE International, IEEE, 2014, pp. 1–10.
[65] Patrick E McSharry, Gari D Clifford, Lionel Tarassenko, and Leonard A
Smith, A dynamical model for generating synthetic electrocardiogram signals,
Biomedical Engineering, IEEE Transactions on 50 (2003), no. 3, 289–294.
191
[66] Fabian Monrose, Michael K Reiter, and Susanne Wetzel, Password hard-
ening based on keystroke dynamics, International Journal of Information
Security 1 (2002), no. 2, 69–83.
[67] George B Moody, W Muldrow, and Roger G Mark, A noise stress test for
arrhythmia detectors, Computers in cardiology 11 (1984), no. 3, 381–384.
[68] David Edward Newland, An introduction to random vibrations, spectral &
wavelet analysis, Courier Corporation, 2012.
[69] Nymi, Nymi corporate website.
[70] Ikenna Odinaka, Po-Hsiang Lai, Alan D Kaplan, Joseph A O’Sullivan, Erik J
Sirevaag, and John W Rohrbaugh, Ecg biometric recognition: A comparative
analysis, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security (T-IFS)
7 (2012), no. 6, 1812–1824.
[71] Michael Oeff, H Koch, R Bousseljot, and D Kreiseler, The ptb diagnostic ecg
database, National Metrology Institute of Germany, http://www. physionet.
org/physiobank/database/ptbdb (2012).
[72] Jiapu Pan and Willis J Tompkins, A real-time qrs detection algorithm, IEEE
transactions on biomedical engineering (1985), no. 3, 230–236.
[73] Francesca Romana Parente, Marco Santonico, Alessandro Zompanti, Mario
Benassai, Giuseppe Ferri, Arnaldo DAmico, and Giorgio Pennazza, An elec-
tronic system for the contactless reading of ecg signals, Sensors 17 (2017),
no. 11, 2474.
[74] Donald B Percival and Andrew T Walden, Wavelet methods for time series
analysis, vol. 4, Cambridge university press, 2006.
[75] Andrea Peterson, 5.6 million fingerprints stolen in cyberattack, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/, 2015.
[76] Konstantinos N Plataniotis, Dimitrios Hatzinakos, and Jimmy KM Lee,
Ecg biometric recognition without fiducial detection, Biometric Consortium
Conference, 2006 Biometrics Symposium: Special Session on Research at
the, IEEE, 2006, pp. 1–6.
[77] Carmen CY Poon, Yuan-Ting Zhang, and Shu-Di Bao, A novel biometrics
method to secure wireless body area sensor networks for telemedicine and
m-health, IEEE Communications Magazine 44 (2006), no. 4, 73–81.
192
[78] Fabienne Pore´e, Gae¨lle Kervio, and Guy Carrault, Ecg biometric analysis
in different physiological recording conditions, Signal, image and video pro-
cessing 10 (2016), no. 2, 267–276.
[79] Peter Sam Raj, Sukanya Sonowal, and Dimitrios Hatzinakos, Non-negative
sparse coding based scalable access control using fingertip ecg, Biometrics
(IJCB), 2014 IEEE International Joint Conference on, IEEE, 2014, pp. 1–6.
[80] Ajita Rattani and Arun Ross, Automatic adaptation of fingerprint liveness
detector to new spoof materials, Biometrics (IJCB), 2014 IEEE International
Joint Conference on, IEEE, 2014, pp. 1–8.
[81] KVR Ravi, R Palaniappan, C Eswaran, and S Phon-Amnuaisuk, Data en-
cryption using event-related brain signals, Conference on Computational In-
telligence and Multimedia Applications, 2007. International Conference on,
vol. 1, IEEE, 2007, pp. 540–544.
[82] Arun Ross and et al., A hybrid fingerprint matcher, Pattern Recognition 36
(2003), no. 7, 1661–1673.
[83] Aditi Roy, Nasir Memon, and Arun Ross, Masterprint: Exploring the vul-
nerability of partial fingerprint-based authentication systems, IEEE Trans-
actions on Information Forensics and Security 12 (2017), no. 9, 2013–2025.
[84] Ulrich Ru¨hrmair and et al., Modeling attacks on physical unclonable func-
tions, Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and commu-
nications security, ACM, 2010, pp. 237–249.
[85] Reza Sameni, Gari D Clifford, Christian Jutten, and Mohammad B Shamsol-
lahi, Multichannel ecg and noise modeling: application to maternal and fetal
ecg signals, EURASIP Journal on Applied Signal Processing 2007 (2007),
no. 1, 94–94.
[86] Reza Sameni, Mohammad B Shamsollahi, Christian Jutten, and Gari D Clif-
ford, A nonlinear bayesian filtering framework for ecg denoising, Biomedical
Engineering, IEEE Transactions on 54 (2007), no. 12, 2172–2185.
[87] Bernhard Scho¨lkopf, Alexander Smola, and Klaus-Robert Mu¨ller, Kernel
principal component analysis, International Conference on Artificial Neural
Networks, Springer, 1997, pp. 583–588.
[88] Khairul Azami Sidek, Ibrahim Khalil, and Magdalena Smolen, Ecg biometric
recognition in different physiological conditions using robust normalized qrs
complexes, 2012 Computing in Cardiology, IEEE, 2012, pp. 97–100.
193
[89] Yogendra Narain Singh and Sanjay Kumar Singh, Evaluation of electro-
cardiogram for biometric authentication., J. Information Security 3 (2012),
no. 1, 39–48.
[90] Sergei Skorobogatov, Flash memory bumpingattacks, Cryptographic Hard-
ware and Embedded Systems, CHES 2010 (2010), 158–172.
[91] Sergei Petrovich Skorobogatov, Semi-invasive attacks: a new approach to
hardware security analysis, Ph.D. thesis, University of Cambridge Ph. D.
dissertation, 2005.
[92] Leif So¨rnmo and Pablo Laguna, Bioelectrical signal processing in cardiac
and neurological applications, vol. 8, Academic Press, 2005.
[93] Pramod Subramanyan and et al., Evaluating the security of logic encryption
algorithms, Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2015 IEEE In-
ternational Symposium on, IEEE, 2015, pp. 137–143.
[94] G Edward Suh and Srinivas Devadas, Physical unclonable functions for de-
vice authentication and secret key generation, Proceedings of the 44th annual
design automation conference, ACM, 2007, pp. 9–14.
[95] Li Sun, Yanping Lu, Kaitao Yang, and Shaozi Li, Ecg analysis using multiple
instance learning for myocardial infarction detection, IEEE transactions on
biomedical engineering 59 (2012), no. 12, 3348–3356.
[96] Paul Syverson, A taxonomy of replay attacks [cryptographic protocols], Com-
puter Security Foundations Workshop VII, 1994. CSFW 7. Proceedings,
IEEE, 1994, pp. 187–191.
[97] David MJ Tax and Klaus-R Mu¨ller, Feature extraction for one-class clas-
sification, Artificial Neural Networks and Neural Information ProcessingI-
CANN/ICONIP 2003, Springer, 2003, pp. 342–349.
[98] Pim Tuyls, Anton HM Akkermans, Tom AM Kevenaar, Geert-Jan Schrijen,
Asker M Bazen, and Raimond NJ Veldhuis, Practical biometric authentica-
tion with template protection, International Conference on Audio-and Video-
Based Biometric Person Authentication, Springer, 2005, pp. 436–446.
[99] Umut Uludag and Anil K Jain, Attacks on biometric systems: a case study
in fingerprints, Security, Steganography, and Watermarking of Multimedia
Contents VI, vol. 5306, International Society for Optics and Photonics, 2004,
pp. 622–634.
194
[100] Carolina Varon, Alexander Caicedo, Dries Testelmans, Bertien Buyse, and
Sabine Van Huffel, A novel algorithm for the automatic detection of sleep
apnea from single-lead ecg, IEEE Transactions on Biomedical Engineering
62 (2015), no. 9, 2269–2278.
[101] Krishna K Venkatasubramanian, Ayan Banerjee, and Sandeep KS Gupta,
Plethysmogram-based secure inter-sensor communication in body area net-
works, Military communications conference, 2008. MILCOM 2008. IEEE,
IEEE, 2008, pp. 1–7.
[102] Shreyas Venugopalan and Marios Savvides, How to generate spoofed irises
from an iris code template, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and
Security 6 (2011), no. 2, 385–395.
[103] Claus Vielhauer and Ralf Steinmetz, Handwriting: Feature correlation anal-
ysis for biometric hashes, EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Process-
ing 2004 (2004), no. 4, 389304.
[104] Yongjin Wang, Foteini Agrafioti, Dimitrios Hatzinakos, and Konstantinos N
Plataniotis, Analysis of human electrocardiogram for biometric recognition,
EURASIP journal on Advances in Signal Processing 2008 (2007), no. 1,
148658.
[105] Sam Weber and et al., A software flaw taxonomy: aiming tools at security,
ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering Notes 30 (2005), no. 4, 1–7.
[106] Bo Yang and et al., Scan based side channel attack on dedicated hardware
implementations of data encryption standard, Test Conference, 2004. Pro-
ceedings. ITC 2004. International, IEEE, 2004, pp. 339–344.
[107] Qijun Zhao, Anil K Jain, Nicholas G Paulter, and Melissa Taylor, Finger-
print image synthesis based on statistical feature models, Biometrics: Theory,
Applications and Systems (BTAS), 2012 IEEE Fifth International Confer-
ence on, IEEE, 2012, pp. 23–30.
Appendix A
Related Publications
[108] N. Karimian, Z. Guo, F. Tehranipoor, D. Woodard, M. Tehranipoor, and
D. Forte, Secure and Reliable Biometric Access Control for Resource-Constrained
Systems and IoT, arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.09710 (2018).
[109] N. Karimian, Z. Guo, M. Tehranipoor, and D. Forte, Human recognition
from photoplethysmography (ppg) based on non-fiducial features, 2017 IEEE In-
ternational Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP),
March 2017, pp. 4636–4640.
[110] N. Karimian, Z. Guo, M. Tehranipoor, and D. Forte, Highly reliable key
generation from electrocardiogram (ecg), IEEE Transactions on Biomedical Engi-
neering 64 (2017), no. 6, 1400–1411.
[111] N. Karimian, F. Tehranipoor, Z. Guo, M. Tehranipoor, and D. Forte, Noise
assessment framework for optimizing ecg key generation, Technologies for Home-
land Security (HST), 2017 IEEE International Symposium on, IEEE, 2017, pp. 1–
6.
195
196
[112] Nima Karimian, Zimu Guo, Mark Tehranipoor, and Domenic Forte, Hu-
man recognition from photoplethysmography (ppg) based on non-fiducial features,
Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), 2017 IEEE International Con-
ference on, IEEE, 2017, pp. 4636–4640.
[113] Nima Karimian, Mark Tehranipoor, and Domenic Forte, Non-fiducial ppg-
based authentication for healthcare application, Biomedical & Health Informatics
(BHI), 2017 IEEE EMBS International Conference on, IEEE, 2017, pp. 429–432.
[114] Nima Karimian, Mark Tehranipoor, Damon Woodard, and Domenic Forte,
Biometrics for authentication in resource-constrained systems.
[115] Nima Karimian, Damon L Woodard, and Domenic Forte, On the vulnerability
of ecg verification to online presentation attacks, Biometrics (IJCB), 2017 IEEE
International Joint Conference on, IEEE, 2017, pp. 143–151.
[116] Nima Karimian, Paul A Wortman, and Fatemeh Tehranipoor, Evolving
authentication design considerations for the internet of biometric things (iobt),
Proceedings of the Eleventh IEEE/ACM/IFIP International Conference on Hard-
ware/Software Codesign and System Synthesis, ACM, 2016, p. 10.
[117] Zimu Guo, Nima Karimian, Mark M Tehranipoor, and Domenic Forte, Hard-
ware security meets biometrics for the age of iot, Circuits and Systems (ISCAS),
2016 IEEE International Symposium on, IEEE, 2016, pp. 1318–1321.
[118] Fatemeh Tehranipoor, Nima Karimian, Mehran Mozaffari Kermani, and
197
Hamid Mahmoodi, Deep rnn-oriented paradigm shift through bocanet: Broken ob-
fuscated circuit attack, arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.03332 (2018).
[119] Fatemeh Tehranipoor, Nima Karimian, Paul A Wortman, Asad Haque, Jim
Fahrny, and John A Chandy, 4 exploring methods of authentication for the internet
of things, Internet of Things: Challenges, Advances, and Applications (2017), 71.
[120] Fatemeh Tehranipoor, Nima Karimian, Kan Xiao, and John Chandy, Dram
based intrinsic physical unclonable functions for system level security, Proceedings
of the 25th edition on Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI, ACM, 2015, pp. 15–20.
[121] Fatemeh Tehranipoor, Nima Karimian, Wei Yan, and John A Chandy, Dram-
based intrinsic physically unclonable functions for system-level security and au-
thentication, IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
25 (2017), no. 3, 1085–1097.
[122] Fatemeh Tehranipoor, Paul Wortman, Nima Karimian, Wei Yan, and John A
Chandy, Dvft: A lightweight solution for power-supply noise-based trng using dy-
namic voltage feedback tuning system, IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale
Integration (VLSI) Systems (2018).
[123] Paul A Wortman, Fatemeh Tehranipoor, Nima Karimian, and John A
Chandy, Proposing a modeling framework for minimizing security vulnerabilities
in iot systems in the healthcare domain, Biomedical & Health Informatics (BHI),
2017 IEEE EMBS International Conference on, IEEE, 2017, pp. 185–188.
198
[124] N. Karimian, F. Tehranipoor, T. Rahman, S. Kelly, and D. Forte, Genetic
algorithm for hardware Trojan detection with ring oscillator network (RON), Tech-
nologies for Homeland Security (HST), 2015 IEEE International Symposium on,
IEEE, 2015, pp. 1–6.
